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PLATO

MENO

STOCK

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
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THE MENO OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PART I.—INTRODUCTION AND TEXT

THIRD EDITION, REVISED
WITH APPENDIX

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PREFACE.

All books are written to satisfy a want, if not on the part of the public, at all events on that of the author. But this book needs less apology than some others; for the Meno is prescribed for the Oxford course, and there is no English edition of it.

The text that has been followed is that of K. F. Hermann. It has not formed part of the scope of this work to discuss differences of reading. My object has been, in the first place, to clear away any difficulties that might present themselves to a novice, except such as merely required a reference to the dictionary, and, in the next place, to supply whatever aids seemed necessary for the full appreciation of the substance and style of the dialogue.

My debt to Stallbaum is immense—far greater than appears from the acknowledgments: but what has been borrowed has become so mixed up with what has been supplied as to render discrimination impossible. A general acknowledgment is therefore the more necessary. Next to Stallbaum most help has been derived from Riddell's admirable Digest of Platonic Idioms, appended to his edition of the Apology, to which a reference has in every case been given.

My thanks are due to my friend, the Rev. R. L. Clarke, of Queen's College, who kindly spared time from more important work to look over the notes. As an examination made under such circumstances was necessarily hasty, any mistakes that may have escaped his vigilance must be credited to me alone. Since writing the above I have found myself laid under deep obligation to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow of Balliol, for his careful supervision of the whole work during its passage through the press, in the course of which many corrections and improvements have been suggested.

ST. G. STOCK.

8 *Museum Villas, Oxford,*
April, 1887.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In this second edition the text has been brought into conformity with that of the Zurich editors, except where the readings of Hermann are reinforced by those of Schanz. In one passage (84 E ad fin., *εἰς γωνίαν ἀντίαν*) where the reading is admittedly doubtful, I have followed Schanz exclusively. The work has been revised throughout and a grammatical index added.

ST. G. STOCK.

8 *Museum Road, Oxford,*
August, 1891.

INTRODUCTION.

1. *Plato is valuable for his method, rather than for any positive dogmatic truth which he teaches.*

'OUT of Plato,' says Emerson, 'come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought'—a sentiment which I remember to have heard expressed in more homely language by one of our own professors—'There 's no sort of rubbish or nonsense that you won't find in Plato.'

Plato's merit is that he taught the world to think—at least the western portion of it: he did not think for it, as Aristotle did after him. Neither scientific terminology nor dogmatic system are to be found in Plato, save in a most rudimentary form. To say that a man is a 'Platonist' does not really give us any definite idea of his philosophical tenets. We infer that he has an enthusiastic belief in the immortality of the soul, grounded on somewhat shaky arguments, and thinks that ignorance lies at the root of evil. We might credit him also with a belief in the power of the mind to acquire knowledge by the royal road of ideas, independently of experience. There perhaps the matter ends. We should hardly go on to suspect him of being in favour of a community of women among the upper classes of society.

It was a question among the Ancients whether Plato dogmatized at all. Those who thought that he did found his own opinions expressed through four characters in the dialogues—Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian stranger in the Laws, and the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist. But even the opinions ascribed to Socrates are detached and tentative rather than final and systematic; they are so many isolated and independent efforts to follow out the train of thought of

the moment—mere random ventures on the sea of thought of a mind that was ready to sail wherever the wind of the argument might blow. It is quite true to say with Voltaire—'Un homme qui saurait tout Platon, et qui ne saurait que Platon, saurait peu, et saurait mal,' only it is slightly off the point. One does not go to Plato for facts of science or ready-made doctrines; but for a spirit and a method, that we may learn to question all things, while at the same time we become kindled with his enthusiasm for truth and virtue.

2. *Dramatic form of Plato's writings—perhaps borrowed from Sicily.*

One of the main reasons for this combination of infinite suggestiveness with such meagreness of positive results is the form which Plato adopted for his writings. Plato dramatised the world of thought as completely as Shakespeare dramatised the world of action. The mind of the Greeks, at the time when Plato wrote, was dominated by the drama, as it had been dominated, in an earlier age, by the forms of epic poetry. Add to this that philosophy—at least moral philosophy—began in conversation amid the gymnasia and porticoes of Athens, and we see that nothing could be more natural than that the first mould into which it ran should be that of the dramatic dialogue. Zeno, the Eleatic, is credited with having been the first to employ the dialogue, or shares the honour with one Alexamenus, otherwise unknown. But before him, we find an anticipation of Plato in a quarter where it might least have been expected, namely, in the great comic poet of Sicily, Epicharmus, whose plays seem to have abounded in philosophical discussions, conducted in due form of dialectic, though in broad Doric verse. Epicharmus predicted that somebody would come after him, who would strip his words of their metre, in place of which he would invest them with stately robes of diction, and prove himself invincible in the arena of thought, while giving a fall to all his antagonists. Whether this prophecy was fulfilled by Plato or not, in the shape of a debt to Epicharmus, it is with his

name alone that the philosophical dialogue is indissolubly associated[1].

It has been often noticed that in Aristotle the influence of the dialogue is not yet extinct. Though his works assume the shape of formal treatises, yet we are everywhere conscious of the presence of a suppressed antagonist—a kind of Devil's Advocate, whose business it was to test the claims of every proposition before it was admitted to the canonisation of truth.

3. *Tendency of the Greeks to dramatise philosophy. Partition of Philosophy.*

The connexion, on which we have been dwelling above, between philosophy in its earliest form and the drama was recognised by the Greeks themselves. The dialogue was defined as being 'composed of question and answer, on some philosophical or political subject, with appropriate character-drawing of the persons who take part in it, and in an ornate style.' This definition was a common-place of antiquity, for we find it not only in Diogenes Laertius, but in identically the same words in the 'Introduction to Plato's Dialogues' by Albinus. Further, it was pointed out how the progress of philosophy presented an analogy to the progress of the drama. As Thespis first added a single actor to the original song of the chorus, then Aeschylus a second, and Sophocles a third: so philosophy had at first only a single department, namely, physical speculation, to which Socrates added moral science, while Plato perfected its structure with the third division of dialectic. Ever after this the form of philosophy was as rigidly fixed as the form of a tragedy; and every systematic exponent or critic started with the assumption of a tripartite division into φυσική, ἠθική, and διαλεκτική, or, as it was called later, λογική. Nor is the division without ground of reason. For philosophy must study either nature (including the divine nature) or man, and if it studies man, it must

[1] The celebrated mime-writers of Sicily, Sophron and Xenarchus, are said to have been great favourites with Plato.

regard him either from the side of the emotions or of the intellect.

4. *Trilogies and tetralogies among the dialogues of Plato.*

The desire to trace an analogy between Plato's philosophy and the drama was pushed to an extreme by those commentators who variously distributed his works into trilogies or tetralogies. The former plan was adopted by Aristophanes the grammarian, whose arrangement starts with the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias, but the cogency of the connexion is in no case very apparent, and, after five trilogies have been established, the attempt at further classification is abandoned. The other distribution into tetralogies, which has been ascribed, though hardly on sufficient grounds, to Thrasyllus, is resolutely carried out from beginning to end. There are just thirty-six works, including the Letters as one, which were acknowledged in antiquity to be Plato's own, so that they fit conveniently into nine tetralogies. Here we start with a very plausible combination in the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. In the Euthyphro, we become aware of the indictment of Socrates by Meletus; in the Apology we listen to the philosopher's defence of himself before his judges; in the Crito we find him refusing to violate the laws of his country by escaping from jail: in the Phaedo we are admitted as auditors to the dying discourse of

> 'Him, the Master of all thought,
> Who took the hemlock and superbly died.'

Here, however, the tie of connection is a historical one, which necessarily fails us in the bulk of the dialogues, from which the biographical element is absent. If the principle were pressed, however, our own dialogue, the Meno, would have a right to precede the four just mentioned, for it shows us the motives which induced Anytus, the real mover in the matter, to get up the indictment against Socrates. But the Meno, as a matter of fact, is ranked along with the Euthy-

demus, Protagoras, and Gorgias in a quartette which deals more especially with the views and pretensions of the Sophists.

5. *Division of the dialogues into theoretical and practical, etc.*

Quite apart from the division into trilogies or tetralogies, there was current also among the Ancients a subtle logical division of the works of Plato, which possesses a real philosophical value.

It is assumed, to begin with, that the works of Plato fall into two main classes, one in which there is a more or less definite conclusion present in the author's mind, to which he wishes to guide the reader, the other in which the object is vague inquiry. This gives us the two principal 'characters' of the λόγος Πλατωνικός—ὑφηγητικός and ζητητικός. The foregone conclusion may be of a merely speculative nature or one bearing upon life and practice. Thus we are led to a subdivision of the first of the two main classes into theoretical and practical; and these again are subdivided respectively into physical and logical, ethical and political. It is on the other side of the division that we must look for the Meno. The 'inquisitory' dialogues are all so many exhibitions of the art of mental wrestling, but may be distinguished into dialogues of practice and of combat (γυμναστικός and ἀγωνιστικός). The latter may end either in proving one's own proposition or upsetting the adversary's (ἐνδεικτικός or ἀνατρεπτικός); the former may assume the shape either of eliciting a conclusion from an unpractised thinker or of demolishing his successive attempts to reach one (μαιευτικός or πειραστικός). Here then are the eight infimae species which we reach in our division. Plato's works are either—physical, logical, ethical, political, elicitory, tentative, probative[1], or eversive. Below these

[1] It is worth noticing that Albinus has ἐλεγκτικός in his list (Hermann's Plato, vol. vi. p. 148), and makes no mention of ἐνδεικτικός. The latter therefore may be a mistake in Diogenes Laertius, iii. § 49. The Protagoras is the only dialogue referred to this head.

there is only the enumeration of the individual dialogues falling under each class, which gives scope for difference of opinion, and we find the list presented by Albinus very different from that of Diogenes Laertius. As to the tentative nature of the Meno, however, all are agreed.

6. *Order of the Platonic dialogues.*

Into the vexed question of the order of the Platonic writings we need not enter here. There is not sufficient internal evidence to establish a chronological order; and, if there were, it would be no clue to the logical order. Plato did not think systematically, but piecemeal, and whoever thinks in that way—and who does not?—will often have suggested to him by one train of reasoning, and supply later, another which seems necessary to lead up to it. Perhaps no more sensible enouncement has been made touching the order of Plato's writings than that of Albinus, who declared that they constituted a perfect circle, and therefore presented no one point which could rightly be considered prior to another. Only it may be said generally that in its leading idea the Meno presents a connection with the Protagoras; for in that dialogue it is ultimately maintained by Socrates that virtue is knowledge, and therefore can be taught. In the Meno this idea seems to be struggling into the light of certainty, when we are plunged back into confusion again by the admitted absence of teachers. On the subordinate, though intrinsically more important, point of the proof of the pre-existence of the soul from the doctrine of reminiscence, the Meno connects itself with the deeper discussion of the same subject in the Phaedo. In its general tone, and in the conduct of the argument, it reminds the reader of the Theaetetus, though that again is a deeper dialogue than ours.

7. *Date of the composition of the Meno.*

As regards the date of composition, Stallbaum and others of the German critics consider the Meno to have been written

during the lifetime of Socrates. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, with whom both Grote and Professor Jowett agree, finds a clear reference to the trial and death of Socrates in the concluding words of the Meno; and indeed it is difficult to understand how any other opinion could be arrived at, unless the critic were throttled by a theory. Professor Jowett goes so far as to say—'There is no reason to suppose that any of the dialogues of Plato were written before the death of Socrates,' setting aside, apparently, as unworthy of credence, the anecdote told by Diogenes Laertius of how Socrates exclaimed, on hearing Plato read the Lysis—'Good heavens! How many lies the young man has been telling about me!' This is really too good not to be true. And it leads us on to another point. For if Plato thus began to make Socrates his mouth-piece even during the lifetime of the latter, with how much more freedom is the process likely to have been carried on after his death! We can well believe therefore that Plato was so penetrated with the habit of uttering his own thoughts through the medium of Socrates, that he became quite indifferent to chronological accuracy. Any thought which was in Plato's mind was liable to be put into Socrates' mouth. Granting this, we can recognise in the Meno an allusion to the bribing of Ismenias the Theban by the Persians, which would fix the approximate date of the dialogue to a period shortly after B.C. 394.

THE TETRALOGIES,

commonly ascribed to Thrasyllus.

Εὐθύφρων, ἢ περὶ ὁσίου	πειραστικός.
Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους	ἠθικός.
Κρίτων, ἢ περὶ πρακτέου	ἠθικός.
Φαίδων, ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς	ἠθικός.
Κρατύλος, ἢ περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων . . .	λογικός.
Θεαίτητος, ἢ περὶ ἐπιστήμης	πειραστικός.
Σοφιστής, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος	λογικός.
Πολιτικός, ἢ περὶ βασιλείας	λογικός.

Παρμενίδης, ἢ περὶ ἰδέων	λογικός.
Φίληβος, ἢ περὶ ἡδονῆς	ἠθικός.
Συμπόσιον, ἢ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ	ἠθικός.
Φαῖδρος, ἢ περὶ ἔρωτος	ἠθικός.
Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἢ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως . . .	μαιευτικός.
Ἀλκιβιάδης δεύτερος, ἢ περὶ προσευχῆς . .	μαιευτικός.
Ἵππαρχος, ἢ φιλοκερδής	ἠθικός.
Ἀντερασταί, ἢ περὶ φιλοσοφίας	ἠθικός.
Θεάγης, ἢ περὶ σοφίας	μαιευτικός.
Χαρμίδης, ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης	πειραστικός.
Λάχης, ἢ περὶ ἀνδρείας	μαιευτικός.
Λύσις, ἢ περὶ φιλίας	μαιευτικός.
Εὐθύδημος, ἢ ἐριστικὸς	ἀνατρεπτικός.
Πρωταγόρας, ἢ Σοφισταί	ἐνδεικτικός.
Γοργίας, ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς	ἀνατρεπτικός.
Μένων, ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς	πειραστικός.
Ἱππίας πρῶτος, ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ	ἀνατρεπτικός.
Ἱππίας δεύτερος, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς . . .	ἀνατρεπτικός.
Ἴων, ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος	πειραστικός.
Μενέξενος, ἢ ἐπιτάφιος	ἠθικός.
Κλειτοφῶν, ἢ προτρεπτικός	ἠθικός.
Πολιτεία, ἢ περὶ δικαίου	πολιτικός.
Τίμαιος, ἢ περὶ φύσεως	φυσικός.
Κριτίας, ἢ Ἀτλαντικός	ἠθικός.
Μίνως, ἢ περὶ νόμου	πολιτικός.
Νόμοι, ἢ περὶ νομοθεσίας	πολιτικός.
Ἐπινομίς, ἢ νυκτερινὸς σύλλογος, ἢ φιλόσοφος	πολιτικός.
Ἐπιστολαί	ἠθικός.

DIVISION OF THE WORKS OF PLATO.



COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE.

How is virtue to be attained?

Meno, a somewhat sophisticated youth, who has studied under Gorgias, propounds to Socrates an inquiry as to how virtue is to be attained. Does it come (1) by teaching, (2) by training, or (3) by nature? (70 A).

What is virtue?

Socrates objects to this question on the ground that he does not know what virtue is, and, what is more, has never met with anybody who did (70 B–71 B). Meno is of opinion that Gorgias knew all about it, and undertakes to answer the question himself (71 C, D).

Meno's account of virtue; he enumerates many virtues.

The virtue of a man, he says, is to be competent to manage affairs of state, and, in managing them, to help his friends and hurt his foes, and avoid being hurt himself. The virtue of a woman is to manage her household well, taking care of the things, and obeying her husband. Again, there is the virtue of a child, whether girl or boy, and of an elder person, of a freeman, and of a slave. In fact, every age, sex, and condition has its different virtue (71 E–72 A).

What is the common element in these?

This first attempt to define virtue is really an enumeration, and not a definition. Accordingly Socrates asks for the essential attributes which cause these various virtues to be called by the same name, illustrating his question by the example of the word 'bee' (72 B).

Explanation of what is meant by a common element or general idea.

Meno only dimly grasps the conception of a general idea (72 C), and Socrates proceeds to enforce his meaning by the

parallel examples of health, strength, and size. Does Meno think that the health of a man is different from the health of a woman? Or that health has one and the same form (εἶδος), wheresoever existent? (72 D, E). Meno is willing to grant the essential unity of these ideas, but thinks that the case of virtue is somehow different from the rest (73 A). Socrates, however, gets him to admit that man and woman, child and elder will alike require the same things, namely, justice and temperance, if they are to be virtuous (73 A, B).

Virtue is the capacity of ruling over men.

It being agreed then that virtue is one and the same thing, wherever found, Meno is again called upon to define it. He does so offhand, declaring virtue to be 'the capacity of ruling over men' (73 C).

Faults of the definition.

This first attempt at a formal definition falls an easy prey to the dialectic of Socrates. For (1) it cannot possibly apply to the virtue of a child or a slave, whereas it is essential to a logical definition that it should be co-extensive with the thing defined; and (2) the mere capacity to rule is not virtue, but only the capacity to rule justly. Meno admits the force of both these objections, saying as to the latter—'For justice, Socrates, is virtue' (73 D).

What is wanted is definition, not enumeration.

Hereupon Socrates asks him whether justice is virtue or a virtue, and sets him floundering once more amid the difficulties of a general idea. Socrates illustrates his own question by the case of figure. He would not call roundness 'figure,' but 'a figure,' because there are other figures. 'Yes,' says Meno, 'and so I say that there are other virtues as well as justice' (73 E). When asked what these are he specifies temperance, wisdom, and magnificence, showing incidentally how wide was the Greek conception of virtue, including, as

it did, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic elements. Socrates again reminds him that what he wants to arrive at is the one idea which underlies these different phases of virtue (74 A).

The definition of figure.

Meno confesses his inability to arrive at this, and Socrates helps him to understand the question by the parallel instances of 'figure' and 'colour' (74 B, C). To say that the round and the straight are both figures is not to say that the round is straight or the straight round, but it is to say that there is something called 'figure' which is common to both (74 D, E). Let Meno then say what this something is (75 A).

Meno throws the task on Socrates, under promise that he, in his turn, will attempt to define virtue; and Socrates accordingly defines figure as 'the only thing which invariably accompanies colour' (75 B). Meno jeers at this definition on the ground that it assumes a knowledge of colour, and thus involves what is known in logic as the fault of *ignotum per ignotius*, or, as in this case, *per aeque ignotum* (75 C). Accordingly Socrates, admitting the principle that a definition should be clearer than the thing defined (75 D), propounds another definition of figure as 'the termination of a solid' (75 E–76 A).

Colour defined in the style of Gorgias.

Meno now calls for a definition of colour; and Socrates, after bantering him on his imperiousness (76 A, B), asks him whether he would like a definition in the style of Gorgias. To this Meno eagerly assents; whereupon Socrates, assuming the Empedoclean doctrine of sense-perception being due to emanations from bodies, defines colour as 'an emanation from bodies commensurate with and perceptible by sight'—a definition which is hailed with enthusiasm by Meno (76 C, D). Socrates hints that Meno likes this definition on account of its pomposity, and expresses his own preference for the definition of figure (76 E).

Meno once more defines virtue.

It is now Meno's turn to define virtue, for which the other definitions were meant by way of practice (77 A).

Adopting the sentiments of some poet, Meno defines virtue as 'the desire for honourable things combined with the power of procuring them' (77 B).

To this it is objected by Socrates that to desire things honourable is to desire good, and all men desire good, so that the definition is wider than the thing defined (77 C–78 A). It follows from this that the difference between one man and another must lie in the power of procuring good, so that Meno's definition now assumes this shape—'Virtue is the power of procuring good things' (78 B).

But in vain.

This third attempt of Meno's at a formal definition of virtue is upset on the ground that good things must be provided justly, if there is to be any virtue in the matter; so that we are in fact defining the genus, virtue, by its species, justice, and are involved in our old vicious circle. It will be necessary to begin the whole thing over again (78 C–79 E).

Socrates confesses his own ignorance, but he is willing to help Meno in finding out what virtue is.

On hearing this, Meno's patience gives way, and he compares Socrates to a torpedo which paralyses everything which comes near to it (80 A, B).

Socrates playfully rejoins that he suspects Meno is fishing for compliments, and wants to hear a simile about himself in return. He pleads guilty to filling others with doubt, but declares that it is because he is full of doubt himself. But though he does not know what virtue is, he is quite ready to join Meno in searching into the matter (80 C, D).

Is such discovery possible? How can we acquire knowledge?

At this point the dialogue takes an unexpected turn, for

Meno suddenly produces a weapon from the armoury of the Sophists, in the shape of a dilemma against the possibility of mental search—

If one knows a thing, search is superfluous; and if one does not know it, search is useless.

Either one knows a thing or one does not.

∴ Search is either superfluous or useless (80 D, E).

Knowledge is reminiscence.

Socrates boldly accepts one horn of this dilemma, declaring that, as a matter of fact, we do know all things. For the soul is immortal, and, though subject to what we call birth and death, is in its essence indestructible. Having therefore existed from all time, it has seen and learnt all things (81 A–C). Now inasmuch as nature is all of a piece, and its truths all connected one with another, there is nothing to prevent the soul which has forgotten anything from tracking it out within itself, by following up any clue, if only it has the energy and perseverance to do so. This is how men can evoke knowledge from their own minds on subjects of which they seemed at starting to be blankly ignorant (81 D).

Meno does not appear at all surprised at the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and metempsychosis, for which we may suppose him to have been prepared by the philosophy of Empedocles; but he is not quite so ready to accept the corollary of reminiscence (81 E).

Socrates accordingly proceeds to illustrate this latter doctrine by a practical example.

Practical illustration of the doctrine. Examination of the slave.

He asks Meno to call one of his numerous pages, a perfectly uneducated lad. Showing this boy a square, Socrates elicits from him that if the side of such a figure were two feet, the figure itself would be four square feet; likewise that a square twice as big as this would consist of eight square feet (82 A–D). Then Socrates asks how big the line would be on which the double square would be described, and the

boy promptly replies that it would be double the size of the other (82 E).

So far the process serves only to illustrate the self-confidence of fancied knowledge. The next thing necessary is to administer the electric shock of doubt, in order to dissipate this fatal presumption. This is effected in a series of questions, by means of which the boy is brought to see that it is a figure of sixteen square feet which would be described on a line four feet long (83 A–C); and again that the line on which the eight foot square is described must be something more than two and less than four feet (83 C, D). The boy tries three feet for the answer, but is shown by the questions that this would give a square of nine feet. Then at last the boy is led to the Socratic wisdom of knowing that he does not know (83 E).

Socrates now enlarges to Meno upon the benefits that attend this cathartic process. The boy indeed knows no more than he did before; but at all events his mind is not preoccupied with a false conceit of knowledge, and he will be ready now to apply himself to search (84 A–C).

Latent truths elicited by questions from the slave.

The advantages of doubt are soon manifest. For presently, under the intellectual midwifery of Socrates, the boy's mind is safely delivered of the conclusion that the square on the diameter of a given square is double of that square (84 D–85 B)—a truth which was somehow latent in his mind, and required only to be called into consciousness by judicious questioning (85 C). But what else can this recovery of knowledge out of oneself be called but 'recollection?' (85 D).

How did the slave acquire this truth?

Now how did the boy come by these true opinions, which require only to be repeatedly evoked in order that they may become certain knowledge? Clearly he must either have got them at some time or have always had them. If he always had them, he must have existed from all eternity. If he got them, it must either have been in this human life of his or in

some other. Admittedly he did not get them in this human life. Therefore he must have had them before. This must have been when he was not a man. But during all time he either is or is not a man. The soul therefore has existed from all time (85 D–86 A).

Such is one of Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul. It is more ingenious than convincing. For

(1) The boy may have got these true opinions on his entry into this human life.

(2) Plato has no right to assume that if he did not get them in this life, he had them from all time; since he may have got them in some prior existence.

Plato is probably a little conscious that the argument is unsound; for he makes Socrates insist only, as the outcome of it, on the duty of vigorously applying oneself to mental search, instead of succumbing to the sophistical argument against its possibility (86 B, C).

Once more, can virtue be taught?

After this interlude Socrates proposes that they should resume the attempt to define virtue. Meno, however, expresses a preference for the original question as to whether it can be taught (86 C). Socrates, after protesting against his waywardness, consents to discuss this question in the only way in which it can be discussed, namely hypothetically, and illustrates his meaning by a mathematical example (86 D–87 A).

Virtue is knowledge, and therefore can be taught.

The hypothesis which is now laid down is, that if virtue is knowledge it will admit of being taught. Accordingly we ask—Is virtue knowledge? (87 B, C).

Now virtue is admittedly a good thing. If then it should turn out that there is no good but knowledge, we should be right in asserting virtue to be knowledge.

But all good things are useful,
And virtue is a good;
∴ Virtue is useful (87 D, E).

If we examine lower goods such as health, strength, beauty, and wealth, we shall find that they are beneficial only when we make a right use of them. The same is true even of such ethical and intellectual qualities as temperance, justice, courage, aptitude to learn, memory, magnificence, and so on (88 A). So far as these are divorced from wisdom they are not necessarily good. Courage, for instance, undirected by reason, is often more hurtful than helpful. In a word, all that the soul attempts or endures must be directed by reason, if happiness is to be the result (88 B, C). Virtue, therefore, being one of the things of the soul, and being necessarily useful, it follows that virtue must be wisdom, since that is the only thing in the soul which is necessarily useful (88 C, D). As for lower goods they are useful only to the wise soul. In man, in fact, everything else depends upon the soul, and everything in the soul depends, for its goodness, upon wisdom (88 D, E).

Virtue has thus been proved to be φρόνησις, or inseparable from it. We may notice in passing that φρόνησις is tacitly assumed to be identical with ἐπιστήμη, from which the argument started. This renders more intelligible the corollary which is immediately drawn, that goodness is not a natural gift (89 A). For, if it were so, we should doubtless have had experts under whose guidance we might select those of the young who were naturally good, to be guarded carefully in the Acropolis for the future service of the State (89 B). Goodness then not being a natural gift, it follows that it comes by teaching, and this is in accordance with our hypothesis, that virtue is knowledge (89 C).

But where are the teachers?

But here we are met with a difficulty. For if a thing admits of being taught, there must be both teachers and learners of it (89 D)—a proposition of which the contrapositive has also to be admitted, namely, that anything of which there are neither teachers nor learners does not admit of being taught.

'Are there not then teachers?' asks Meno, to which Socrates replies that he has often sought for them in vain (89 E).

At this point in the dialogue we become aware of the presence of a third person, Anytus, who is represented as a highly respectable Athenian citizen. He is a family friend of Meno's. So Socrates enlists his services in the inquiry (90 A, B).

Are not the Sophists teachers of virtue?

Socrates is of opinion that the proper teachers of any subject must be those who make a profession of it, and demand a fee for imparting instruction (90 C–E). The persons who answer this description in the present instance are—the Sophists (91 A–C).

Anytus stoutly denies this view of the Sophists. They are the corrupters of youth.

On hearing this Anytus flares up, and denounces the Sophists as the corrupters of society. Socrates professes surprise at this view. Any other class of men who were in the habit of spoiling what they were supposed to improve would quickly be found out. How is it then that the Sophists are not found out? How is it that Protagoras, for instance, could spend forty years in the exercise of his profession, and die universally respected? If the Sophists really corrupt the young, it must be either voluntarily or involuntarily. In the latter case they must be mad, instead of being, as some people suppose them to be, the wisest of men (91 C–92 A).

'No,' says Anytus, 'it is not they who are mad, but the young men and their parents, and the states for not expelling them' (92 A, B).

At this point Socrates gently hints that Anytus may be animated by personal feeling against the Sophists—an insinuation which Anytus meets with an indignant declaration that he never had anything to do with them, and hoped he never might (92 B).

Socrates is at a loss to know how Anytus, on his own

showing, came to form so decided a judgment, unless indeed he were aided by divine inspiration (92 C). But, after all, the question is not who spoil the youth, but who teach them virtue. Will Anytus kindly impart his assistance to Meno in this matter? 'Why didn't you tell him yourself?' says Anytus. 'Well, I did,' replies Socrates, 'but it seems I was wrong. It is now your turn' (92 D).

Cannot the good teach virtue?

Anytus, on being thus challenged, gives it as his opinion that any respectable citizen of Athens would be a better teacher of virtue than the Sophists: whereupon Socrates inquires whether these teachers were taught by any one themselves (92 E). Anytus supposes that they were; and asks Socrates whether he does not think that there have been many good men in Athens? Socrates is quite ready to admit this: but insists that the question before them is whether this goodness is transmissible by teaching (93 A, B).

After all; can virtue be taught? Experience is against it.

Socrates now adduces examples to show that virtue cannot be imparted by teaching. If it could, surely such men as Themistocles (93 C–E), Aristeides (94 A), Pericles (94 B), and Thucydides the statesman (94 C, D) would have taken care to impart it to their sons? But this they admittedly did not, though they had them carefully trained in minor accomplishments.

These examples only serve to enrage Anytus, who retires into silence, after advising Socrates not to make so free with people's characters (94 E).

Socrates resumes with Meno. Experience seems to show that virtue cannot be taught.

Socrates and Meno are now left to finish the dialogue by themselves. Socrates begins by remarking that Anytus was mistaken if he supposed that there was any personal reflection

intended upon himself, after which he addresses himself directly to Meno (95 A). It appears that in Meno's country there is the same diversity of opinion as elsewhere with regard to the teachability of virtue (95 B). Gorgias never professed to teach it, nor can Meno make up his mind as to the claims of the Sophists generally (95 C). Socrates reminds him that there is a similar vacillation of opinion to be found in the poet Theognis (95 D, E).

Here, then, is a curious paradox. Those who profess the theory of virtue are said to fail themselves in practice; those who admittedly succeed in practice are not clear as to whether it can be taught or not. On the whole it would seem that neither Sophists nor statesmen can be admitted to be teachers of virtue (96 A, B).

But where there are no teachers there can be no learners.

And where there are no teachers nor learners a thing does not admit of being taught.

∴ Virtue does not admit of being taught (96 C).

Knowledge and right opinion.

We now come to the final turn in the dialogue, which leads us to such conclusion as it contains. Socrates suddenly discovers that there was something which they overlooked in the preceding arguments, namely, that knowledge was not the only thing by which action could be rightly guided (96 D, E). There was something else which could serve the same purpose, and this thing was right opinion (97 A, B).

Wherein then lies the difference between knowledge and right opinion? And whence the acknowledged superiority of the former? The difference perhaps consists in the permanence of knowledge, which is secured by the chain of causation. For right opinion is a runaway thing, like the fabled statues of Daedalus, and needs to be bound, if it is to be of any service (97 C–98 A).

Some such difference there must be between knowledge and right opinion. For Socrates does not wish to dogmatize upon the exact nature of the difference: but that there is a difference is one of the few things he is prepared positively

to assert. Still, as far as regards action, right opinion is no less useful a thing than knowledge (98 B, C).

Coming back now to our question as to how virtue is acquired—

We have seen that good men are useful; and that usefulness implies either knowledge or right opinion. But neither of these comes by nature (this point is allowed to pass unchallenged). It follows therefore that men are not good by nature (98 C, D).

The other alternative would seem to be that virtue is the result of teaching. As to this, we came to the conclusion that it would admit of being taught, if it were wisdom, and, conversely, that, if it did admit of being taught, it would be wisdom (98 D).

But here we become involved in a difficulty. For we saw reason to admit that, if there were teachers of a thing, it could be taught, and that, if there were not, it could not be taught. And now we have admitted that there are no teachers of virtue; and, in so doing, have admitted that it cannot be taught, and therefore is not wisdom (98 E).

But virtue is good, and this goodness consists in right guidance; and, chance apart, there are two things only which guide rightly, namely, true opinion and knowledge; and of these knowledge has been shown not to be the guide in political conduct, since no statesman can teach others to be like himself (98 E–99 A).

Is virtue the result of right opinion and divine dispensation?

From all these considerations there emerges the conclusion that the successful conduct of politics is due to sound opinion (εὐδοξία), not based on knowledge: so that statesmen are in much the same condition as diviners and soothsayers, who say many things that are true, but understand nothing of what they are saying; and we may fairly call them inspired persons, and say that virtue comes by divine dispensation, without intelligence, if it comes at all (99 C–E), unless indeed we were

to meet with some one who was able to make others like himself, in which case we should instantly set down such a person as the one reality among a set of moving shadows (100 A). This then is the answer to the question with which we started, namely, that virtue comes by divine dispensation (*θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*). But we shall have a better chance of arriving at truth, if, at another time, we begin by inquiring what virtue is.

ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT.

THE argument of the Meno seems to fall naturally into three main divisions—

I. *The attempt to define virtue*, arising out of the initial question—'Can virtue be taught?' 70 A–80 D.

II. *The exposition of the doctrine of reminiscence*, in answer to the sophistical argument against the possibility of search; 80 D–86 C.

III. *Hypothetical resumption of the original question;* 86 C–100 C.

These three parts may be further subdivided as follows—

I. *The attempt to define virtue;* 70–80 D.

a. Introductory; 70–71 D.

b. Enumeration of virtues in mistake for a definition; 71 E–73 C.

c. First definition of virtue, as 'the capacity to rule over men,' refuted; 73 C–74 A.

d. Method of definition illustrated by the case of figure, which is defined to be

(1) the sole invariable concomitant of colour;

(2) the termination of a solid, 74 B–76 A,

and of colour, which is defined, in accordance with the philosophy of Empedocles, to be 'an emanation from bodies commensurate with and perceptible by sight;' 76 A–E.

e. Second definition of virtue, 'To desire noble things and be able to attain them,' refuted; 77 A–78 B.

f. Third definition of virtue, as 'The power of providing what is good,' refuted; 78 C–79 E.

g. Despair of Meno; 80 A–D.

II. *Exposition of the doctrine of reminiscence;* 80 D–86 B.

a. Dilemma against the possibility of search; 80 D, E.

b. Statement of the doctrine of reminiscence; 81 A–82 B.

c. Illustration of the doctrine in the person of Meno's page (82 B–86 B) comprising

(1) The dissipation of fancied knowledge; 82 C–83 E.

(2) Inculcation of the advantages of doubt; 84 A–C.

(3) The recovery of knowledge within the soul; 84 D–86 B.

III. *Hypothetical resumption of the original question;* 86 C–100 C.

a. Illustration of the meaning of hypothesis; 86 C–87 C.

b. Proof that virtue is knowledge or prudence, and must therefore come by teaching, and not by nature; 87 D–89 B.

c. Objection. There are no teachers (89 C, D); for

(1) The Sophists, who profess virtue, are not so; 89 E–92 D.

(2) Neither are the statesmen who display it; 92 E–94 E.

d. General uncertainty as to the teachability of virtue; 95 A–96 B.

e. Resulting conclusion that virtue cannot be taught; 96 B, C.

f. Discovery that right opinion may serve as a substitute for knowledge; 96 D–98 C.

g. Recapitulation of the argument, culminating in the conclusion that virtue, as we know it, is not founded on knowledge, and must therefore be a kind of inspiration; 98 C–100 C.

MENO.

ΜΕΝΩΝ

[ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς· πειραστικός.]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ,

ΑΝΥΤΟΣ.

I. The attempt to define virtue, 70 A–80 D.

a. Introductory, 70–71 D.

70 ΜΕΝ. Ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ;

ΣΩ. Ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφ' ἱππικῇ τε B καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι. τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς C εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅ τι ἄν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ

οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος. ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν· ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονε, καὶ 71
κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρ' ὑμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινὰ ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός τις εἶναι, ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ' ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι· ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτό, ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετή, τυγχάνω εἰδώς.

Ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω· συμπένομαι Β
τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστι, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστί, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς οὐδ' ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ C
οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

ΣΩ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

ΜΕΝ. Τί δαί; Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε ἐνθάδε ἦν;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε.

ΜΕΝ. Εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι;

ΣΩ. Οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδε, καὶ σὺ ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν· ἀνάμνησον οὖν D
με, πῶς ἔλεγεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δή που σοὶ ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι.

MEN. Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σώζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶ παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστι· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὡσαύτως δέ, οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

b. Enumeration of virtues in mistake for a definition 71 E–73 C

ΣΩ. Πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνεύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων. ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστι, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς;

MEN. Τοῦτ' ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ μέλιτταί εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα· τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ C
εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων, ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν
ἅπασαι· τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι; εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ
καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι
ἔχουσι, δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέ-
ψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι,
ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀρετή· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅ τι λέγω; D

ΜΕΝ. Δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὡς βού-
λομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ,
ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ
περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι
ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός
ἐστιν, ἐάν περ ὑγίεια ᾖ, ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ
ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ; E

ΜΕΝ. Ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγιειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὸς
καὶ γυναικός.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς; ἐάν περ ἰσχυρὰ
γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται;
τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ
ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάν τε ἐν γυναικί·
ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάν 73
τε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάν τε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάν τε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάν
τε ἐν ἀνδρί;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι
ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;

B ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄν περ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσι, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοικήσουσιν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνονται.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

C ΣΩ. Πάντες ἄρ' ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοί εἰσι· τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται.

c. First definition of virtue as 'the capacity to rule over men' refuted, 73 C–74 A

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἦ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἣν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστί, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ' ἐκείνου.

ΜΕΝ. Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώ-

D πων; εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ' ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵῳ τε

εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων;

MEN. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε. ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει· ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τ' εἶναι· οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή;

MEN. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις; E

MEN. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε, ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα.

MEN. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς.

ΣΩ. Τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ· οἷον καὶ ἐγὼ σοὶ εἴποιμι 74
ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις· καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

MEN. Ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν· πολλὰς αὖ εὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νῦν δή· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.

Meaning defini- n illus- ted by e case of ure and colour, B–76 E.

MEN. Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, B
μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἷός τ' ὦ, ἡμᾶς προσβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γάρ που, ὅτι οὑτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν δὴ

ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστι σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων ; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἢ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι ; εἶπες δήπου ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες ἄν ;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὅ τι ἔστι, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ χρῶμά τι ; εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα ;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα,

D ἔλεγες ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅ τι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, τί ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα,

E καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις ;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον ;

MEN. Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο, οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστι τὸ σχῆμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅ τι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅ τι λέγεις· ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ταὐτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη· τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν. 75

ΜΕΝ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ. B

ΣΩ. Βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Προθυμητέον τοίνυν· ἄξιον γάρ.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστι σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχει αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες. C

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΜΕΝ. Ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;

ΣΩ. Τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε· καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πραότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος. πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. λέγε γάρ μοι· τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ ἔσχατον· πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω· ἴσως δ' ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο· ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι· τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

2nd definition of figure, as 'the termination of a solid.'

MEN. Ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίαις;

MEN. Ἔγωγε καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων, σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμα· ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

MEN. Τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὦ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν, ὅ τί ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.

Definition of colour in accordance with the philosophy of Empedocles.

MEN. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ' εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.

ΣΩ. Κἂν *κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν.*

ΜΕΝ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι *οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες, ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ὦσι. καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας, ὅτι εἰμὶ* C *ἥττων τῶν καλῶν. χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.*

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν *χάρισαι.*

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν *σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις;*

ΜΕΝ. Βούλομαι· *πῶς γὰρ οὔ;*

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν *λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;*

ΜΕΝ. Σφόδρα *γε.*

ΣΩ. Καὶ *πόρους, εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται;*

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ *γε.*

ΣΩ. Καὶ *τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι;* D

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι *ταῦτα.*

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν *καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι;*

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ *τούτων δὴ ξύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἔστι γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.*

ΜΕΝ. Ἀριστά *μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.*

ΣΩ. Ἴσως *γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται· καὶ ἅμα, οἶμαι, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνήν,* E *ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.*

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ *μὲν οὖν.*

ΣΩ. Τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.

MEN. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη βελτίων· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ' εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης.

77 MEN. Ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.

e. 2nd definition of virtue— 'To desire noble things and be able to attain them'— refuted, 77 A–78 B

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι, ὅ τι ἔστι, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἓκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντας τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλ' ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν

B ἀρετή· τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρ' ἐμοῦ εἴληφας.

MEN. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;

MEN. Μάλιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν,

C ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ὥριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΜΕΝ. Γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; D

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ;

ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακά, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οἳ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων, ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά· ὥστε οἳ ἀγνοοῦντες E αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὔ;

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; οἳ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον, ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσι δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπ' αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται 78 ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ' ὅσον βλάπτονται;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;

ΜΕΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;

B ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι;

ΜΕΝ. Εἶπον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον

C ἀρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά.

f. 3rd definition of virtue, as 'The power of providing what is good' refuted, 78 C–79 E.

ΜΕΝ. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΣΩ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τ' εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον, καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς; μὴ ἄλλ' ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι D
ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως
πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστίθης τι τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ,
ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει,
ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ
ἀρετὴν καλεῖς;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ κακίαν.

ΣΩ. Πάντως δήπου δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ
πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι,
ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, E
καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν
μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη
ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγα-
θῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν
μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δ' ἂν ἄνευ
πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία. 79

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγου πρότερον μόριον
ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην
καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με;

ΜΕΝ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι
μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα
καθ' ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις

B δέ μοι, ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν, ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων.

ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἔστι, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου C ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ' οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅ τι ἔστιν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

D ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ' ἐγώ σοι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅ τι ἔστιν, οἷου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν E τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς

δεῆσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις· ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου;

Despair of Meno, A–D.

ΜΕΝ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς 80
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον νarκᾶν ποιεῖ· καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, νarκᾶν. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ B
στόμα νarκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδ' ὅ τι ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ' ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ' ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης.

ΣΩ. Πανοῦργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπατησάς με.

ΜΕΝ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με εἵκασας. C

ΜΕΝ. Τίνος δὴ οἴει;

ΣΩ. Ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι. λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γάρ, οἶμαι, τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ

νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὃ
D ἔστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ἤδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἅψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅ τί ποτε ἔστιν.

II. Exposition of the doctrine of reminiscence, 80 D–86 B.

a. Dilemma against the possibility of search, 80 D, E.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅ τι ἔστι; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσει ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ἤδησθα;

E ΣΩ. Μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδεν οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γε ὃ οἶδε ζητοῖ· οἶδε γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως· οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅ τι ζητήσει.

b. Statement of the doctrine of reminiscence, 81 A–82 B.

81 ΜΕΝ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔχεις λέγειν ὅπῃ;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα—

ΜΕΝ. Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.

ΜΕΝ. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες;

ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἷοις τ'
B εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσι, ταυτί

ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ σκόπει, εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὃ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε· δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον·

οἷσι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἄλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτει
ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰν πάλιν,
ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ C
καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι
ἄνδρες αὔξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ
πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.

Ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν D μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειε καὶ ἔστι τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε δὲ ἐργατικούς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς ποιεῖ· ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων E ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ΜΕΝ. Ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι ὡς οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι πανοῦργος εἶ·

82 καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, ὃς οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγων.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ἀλλ' εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκεν. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν **B** πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὁντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι.

c. Illustration of the doctrine in the person of Meno's page (82 B–86 B), comprising—

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.

ΣΩ. Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής.

ΣΩ. Πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ὁπότερ' ἄν σοι φαίνηται, ἢ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρ' ἐμοῦ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ προσέξω.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον **C** χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ;

(1) The dissipation of fancied knowledge, 82 C–83 E.

ΠΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ αὕτη δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἑνὸς ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἄλλο τι ἢ δὶς δυοῖν γίγνεται ; D

ΠΑΙ. Γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα δὶς γίγνεται ποδῶν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ δύο δὶς πόδες ; λογισάμενος εἰπέ.

ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν γένοιτ' ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἕτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώ.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται ἐκεί- E νου ἡ γραμμὴ ἑκάστη ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν· τί δὲ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου ;

ΠΑΙ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶ πάντα ; καὶ νῦν οὗτος οἴεται εἰδέναι, ὁποία ἐστὶν ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γενήσεται· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οἶδεν οὖν ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οἴεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμιμνησκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι. σὺ δέ μοι λέγε· ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῂς τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον γίγνεσθαι ; τοιόνδε 83

λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω ὥσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι.

ΠΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, ἂν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης δή, φῂς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον, ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

B ΣΩ. Ἀναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. ἄλλο τι ἢ τουτὶ ἂν εἴη ὃ φῂς τὸ ὀκτώπουν εἶναι ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ταυτὶ τέτταρα, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶ τῷ τετράποδι ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσον οὖν γίγνεται ; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον ;

ΠΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον ;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον ;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

C ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα, οὐχί ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὀκτώπουν δ' ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς ; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον ;

ΠΑΙ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησὶ τουτί ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν διπλάσιόν ἐστι, τούτου δὲ ἥμισυ ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἢ τοσησδί ; ἢ οὔ ; D

ΠΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου. καί μοι λέγε· οὐχ ἥδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν ἦν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμὴν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος.

ΠΑΙ. Δεῖ.

ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῂς αὐτὴν εἶναι. E

ΠΑΙ. Τρίποδα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ᾖ, τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους ; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως δύο μὲν οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῂς.

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν ᾖ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται ;

ΠΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐννέα.

ΣΩ. Ἔδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γίγνεται.

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς·
84 καὶ εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας. (2) Inculcation of the advantages of doubt, 84 A–C.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα.

ΣΩ. Ἐννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὗ ἐστὶν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠΐδει μὲν οὔ, ἥ τις ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμή, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὖν ᾤετό γ' αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν· νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἤδη, καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ
B οἶδεν, οὐδ' οἴεται εἰδέναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ ἤδει;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει· νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολ-
C λάκις ᾤετ' ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν μήκει.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οἴει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησε τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὄνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας;

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅ τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος· φύλαττε δὲ ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα.

3) The ecovery of nowledge ithin the oul, 4 D–86 B.

Λέγε γάρ μοι σύ· οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστὶ χωρίον ; μανθάνεις ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τουτὶ ἴσον ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἑκατέρῳ τούτων ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθ' ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα χωρία τάδε ; **E**

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίγνεται ;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἔδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν ἀντίαν τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων ; **85**

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἴσαι, περιέχουσαι τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον ;

ΠΑΙ. Γίγνονται.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή· πηλίκον τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἥμισυ ἑκάστου ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέτμηκεν ἐντός ; ἢ οὔ ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν ;

ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρα.

ΣΩ. Πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε ;

ΠΑΙ. Δύο.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν ;

ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσια.

B ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται ;

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώπουν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ τετράποδος ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλοῦσι δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί· ὥστ' εἰ ταύτη διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων ; ἔστιν ἥντινα δόξαν οὐχ αὑτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο ;

C ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἤδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὗται αἱ δόξαι· ἢ οὔ ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν ;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων. D

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει, ἤτοι ἔλαβέ ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων· εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέ ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ δεδίδαχέ τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει E περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαχε; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονε καὶ τέθραπται.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ' οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν.

ΣΩ. Ἔχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει; 86

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅτ' οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὂν ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὂν ἂν μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρ' οὖν τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν
B ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρή, ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος, ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι;

MEN. Εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι δ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν, ἃ μή τις οἶδε, βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα, ἃ μὴ
C ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.

MEN. Καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν, ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή; III. Hypothetical resumption of the original question, 86C–100C.

MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι
D αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς. *a*. Illustration of the meaning of hypothesis, 86C–87C.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον

ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἔστι πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι· τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν; ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι, ποιόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν **E** ὅ τι ἔστιν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, **87** εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι οὔπω οἶδα εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μέν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε· εἰ μέν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον, οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ, οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι ταῦτα παθεῖν· ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, **B** εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή.

Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅ τί ἐστιν οὔθ' ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποιόν τί ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν; πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν· διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα· ἀλλ' ἆρα διδακτόν; ἢ **C** τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δ' οὔ.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι, πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἄλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.

D ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.

b. Proof that virtue is knowledge or prudence, and must therefore come by teaching, and not by nature, 87 D–89 B.

ΣΩ. Τί δαὶ δή; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὖτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τιν' αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀρετῇ γ' ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων.

ΣΩ. Σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν· ἢ σὺ 88
ἄλλως φῂς ἢ οὕτως;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε. B

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή, τούτων ἆττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ; οἷον ἀνδρεῖα, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἷον θάρρος τι· οὐχὶ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία· μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ σφόδρα. C

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δ' εἰς τοὐναντίον;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστι, προσγενομένης δὲ φρο-

D *νήσεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφελιμόν γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν' εἶναι.*

MEN. *Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.*

ΣΩ. *Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτον τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἆρ' οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη*
E *βλαβερά, οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;*

MEN. *Πάνυ γε.*

ΣΩ. *Ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δ' ἡ ἄφρων;*

MEN. *Ἔστι ταῦτα.*

ΣΩ. *Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστι, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι,*
89 *τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον· φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;*

MEN. *Πάνυ γε.*

ΣΩ. *Φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι;*

MEN. *Δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.*

ΣΩ. *Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί.*

MEN. *Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.*

B ΣΩ. *Καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδ' ἦν· εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες*

ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν. χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.

MEN. Εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, ἆρα μαθήσει ; **C**

c. Objection. There are no teachers (89 C, D); for

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως νὴ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν ;

MEN. Καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει μὲν ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.

MEN. Τί οὖν δή ; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ **D** καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ ἀρετή ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἴ ἔστι διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι ;

MEN. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ·

(1) The Sophists, who profess virtue, are not so, 89 E-92 D.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε **E** μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι ;

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα· ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν, εἴ τινες εἶεν αὐτῆς δικά-

σκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ καὶ τούτων μάλιστα, οὓς ἂν οἴωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδοῖμεν ἄν-
90 Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μέν ἐστι πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὑτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης
B τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλὴς ἀνήρ· ἔπειτα τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψε καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει· αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτ' εἰσὶν εἴτε μή, καὶ οἵτινες.

Σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἄνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τίνες ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι. ὧδε δὲ σκέψαι· εἰ βουλοί-
C μεθα Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἆρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς;

ΑΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα γενέσθαι, ἆρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους;

ΑΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;

ΑΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὧδε δή μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι· ἆρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-

γῶμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν D
σωφρονοῖμεν ἄν, τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης
μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπ'
αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βου-
λομένου ἰέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα
βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν;

ΑΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ
αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι βουλομένους αὐλητήν E
τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν
τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν,
ἄλλοις δέ τισι πράγματα παρέχειν, ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν
παρὰ τούτων, οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι,
μήτ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητὴς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος,
ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν ὃν ἂν πέμπωμεν.
οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι;

ΑΝ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετ' ἐμοῦ
κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτουὶ Μένωνος. 91
οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρός με, ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ
ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε
οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας
τοὺς αὑτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέ-
ξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς
ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν B
πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιμεν. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ
τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους
ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς κοι-
νοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν
τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους;

ΑΝ. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σύ, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἵους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

C ΑΝ. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων, μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε; οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιουμένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅ τι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ D ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσι; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν· καίτοι τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια E ἐξακούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανε διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανε πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη· οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα· καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὶ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται· καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ 92 καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς

νέους, ἢ λελῆθέναι καὶ ἑαυτούς ; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσωμεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι ;

ΑΝ. Πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων· τούτων δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῶσαι αὐτοὺς B εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἠδίκηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ ;

ΑΝ. Οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Ἄπειρος ἄρ' εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ;

ΑΝ. Καὶ εἴην γε. C

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὐ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἶης ;

ΑΝ. Ῥᾳδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἷοί εἰσιν, εἴτ' οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμὶ εἴτε μή.

ΣΩ. Μάντις εἶ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε· ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσί, παρ' οὓς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθηρὸς γένοιτο· οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ D σὺ βούλει, ἔστωσαν οἱ σοφισταί· ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργέτησον, φράσας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτ' ἂν ἄξιος λόγου.

ΑΝ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὓς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φῄς· καὶ

E ἴσως τι λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων· εἰπὲ ὄνομα ὅτου βούλει.

(2) Neither are the statesmen who display it, 92 E–94 E.

ΑΝ. Τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι; ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάν περ ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ' οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἷοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα, ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ
93 ἔμαθον;

ΑΝ. Καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;

ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασι τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὤν· οὐκ εἰ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδ' εἰ
B γεγόνασιν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλ' εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι σκοποῦμεν. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν, ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν ἄλλῳ παρ' ἄλλου· τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων.

Ὧδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου· Θεμιστοκλέα
C οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, κἀκεῖνον εἶναι;

ΑΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', οἶει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ; ἢ οἶει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ D ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν υἱὸν ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν; ἐπέμενε γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν, ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἶχετο· ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;

ΑΝ. Ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ υἱέος αὐτοῦ ᾐτιάσατ' ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν.

ΑΝ. Ἴσως οὐκ ἄν. E

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἅπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ πρεσβυτέρου;

ΑΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ υἱὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή;

ΑΝ. Ἴσως μὰ Δί' οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος μὲν δή σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι· ἄλλον δὲ δὴ σκεψώμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου· 94 ἢ τοῦτον οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαίδευσεν, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὁτουοῦν πεποιηκέναι;

τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν.
B εἰ δὲ βούλει, Περικλέα, οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν
ἄνδρα, οἶσθ' ὅτι δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάν-
θιππον;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σύ, ἱππέας μὲν
ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ
ἀγωνίαν καὶ τἆλλα ἐπαίδευσεν, ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται,
οὐδενὸς χείρους· ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο
ποιῆσαι; δοκῶ μέν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτόν.
ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οἴῃ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων
C ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι ὅτι
Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψε, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον,
καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσε τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν
κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων· τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε, τὸν
δὲ Εὐδώρῳ· οὗτοι δέ που ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα
παλαίειν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, ἀκοῇ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει
D δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας
τοὺς αὑτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας
ποιῆσαι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν; ἀλλὰ
γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ
πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας
μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν
ἂν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειν,
ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζε
E διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε
Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.

ΑΝ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν

ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ· οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι. 95

d. General uncertainty as to the teachability of virtue, 95 A–96 B.

ΣΩ. Ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν· καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων. ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς διδάσκαλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν ; B

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὔ.

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δαὶ δή ; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς ; C

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
D τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ
δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθ' ὅτι ταὐτὰ
ταῦτα λέγει;

MEN. Ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὗ λέγει

καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἵζε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν
E συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;

MEN. Φαίνεταί γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,

εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα, λέγει
πως ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον
οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ
οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
96 πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τἀναντία
λέγει;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος,
οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων
διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι,
B ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασὶ *e.* Resulting conclusion that virtue cannot be taught, 96 B, C.
διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγα-
θοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ; τοὺς
οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως
διδασκάλους εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί; C

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ὡμολογήκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαloι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;

f. Discovery that right opinion may serve as a substitute for knowledge, 96 D–98 C.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα. D ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἐνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους ποιήσει—λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας E πρὸς τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθε καταγελάστως, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα—ἢ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγειν ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους

εἶναι, ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως
97 ἔχοι· ἦ γάρ ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς δὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. εἴ τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

B ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ' ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕως γ' ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐδὲν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ὁποῖόν τι
C εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

ΜΕΝ. Τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπι-

στήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ' οὔ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται· ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅ τι δή ποτε πολὺ D τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι' ὅ τι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν δι' ὅ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γ' εἰπέ.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν· ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστι παρ' ὑμῖν.

ΜΕΝ. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή; E

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινὸς ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ παραμένει· δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον· πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστί. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολυν δὲ χρόνον 98 οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστί, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.

B MEN. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε τοιούτῳ τινί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰκάζων· ὅτι δέ ἐστί τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην, ἓν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.

MEN. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη;

C MEN. Καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

g. Recapitulation of the argument. Virtue is not founded on knowledge, and must be a kind of inspiration, 98C–100C.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι' ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει
D ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, οὐδ' ἐπίκτητα—ἢ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;

MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν.

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, Ε μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, 99 δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται· ᾧ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐπιστήμῃ δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ Β μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὗς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγε· διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσιν, ἅτε οὐ δι' ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν
C γίγνεται· ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

D ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε, οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

E ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ

αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μή τις εἴη 100
τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν, οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσι τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ εὐθὺς τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.

ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. B

ΣΩ. Ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς παραγίγνεται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή. νῦν δ' ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα σοι ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πείθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πραότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅ C
τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις.

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THE MENO OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A.

PEMBROKE COLLEGE

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NOTES.

MENΩN] Of the person who gives his name to this dialogue we know from the text itself that he was a Thessalian (70 A), the son of Alexidemus (76 E), that relations of hospitality existed between his family and that of Anytus (90 B, 92 D), that he was a favourite of Aristippus of Larissa, one of the noble family of the Aleuadae (70 B), that he was a disciple of Gorgias, and familiar with the philosophy of Empedocles (76 C), and that his family stood well with the court of Persia (98 D); we are led to infer also that he was handsome, rich, and noble (71 B), and was still in the bloom of youth (76 A–C).

From the connection with Aristippus the Thessalian and the court of Persia, there is good reason for identifying the Meno of Plato with the Meno of Xenophon's Anabasis. For in the Anabasis we meet with an Aristippus, the Thessalian, who was a guest-friend of Cyrus the Younger; and Xenophon relates how, being hard pressed by the opposite faction at home, he came to Cyrus and procured means for maintaining a mercenary force, which was not to be disbanded till Cyrus could avail himself of its aid against his brother Artaxerxes (Anab. I. 1. § 10). Now we find 1500 men from this force joining Cyrus at Colossae under the command of Meno the Thessalian (Anab. I. 2. § 6), whose youth and good looks had won him the favour of Aristippus (II. 6. § 28).

At first Meno appears to have enjoyed the chief place in Cyrus' favour. He commanded the right wing at the review held at Tyriaeum, while Clearchus commanded the left (Anab. I. 2. § 15); and it was he who was chosen to escort the Phoenician queen, Epyaxa, back into her own country (I. 2. § 20). On this expedition he sacked the town and palace of Tarsus, in revenge for the loss of 100 hoplites on the mountains, who, it was supposed, might have been cut off by the Cilicians (I. 2. § 25).

When the army was halting at Thapsacus, on the banks of the Euphrates, and it was doubtful whether the soldiers would consent to march against the King, Meno persuaded his men to be the first to cross the river, and was magnificently rewarded by Cyrus in con-

sequence (I. 4. § 17). This seems to have been the culminating point of Meno's fortunes.

Shortly after this a feud arose between him and Clearchus, originating in a soldier's quarrel, and they were only prevented from engaging their forces by the intervention of Proxenus the Boeotian (who, like Meno himself, had been a disciple of Gorgias (II. 6. § 16)), reinforced by the energetic interference of Cyrus himself (I. 5. §§ 11–17). From this time forward Clearchus seems to have gained in favour both with the army and with Cyrus. In the review held in the plains of Babylonia, as in the battle of Cunaxa itself, the right wing was commanded by Clearchus and the left by Meno (I. 7. § 1; I. 8. § 4).

Subsequently to the death of Cyrus, Meno, who was the guest-friend of Ariaeus (II. 1. § 5), was suspected of treason by Clearchus (II. 5. § 28), a belief which was shared by Xenophon himself (II. 4. § 15). After the treacherous seizure of the generals by the Persians, Ariaeus told the Greeks that Clearchus was dead, but that Proxenus and Meno were held in high honour, because they had revealed his plots (II. 5. § 38). This appears to have been a mere lie. Proxenus, according to Xenophon, was a man of stainless honour, and shared the fate of the other generals (II. 6. §§ 19, 20), and although Meno was spared at first, it was only to linger out for a year an ignominious life crowned by a wretched death (II. 6. § 29). His character is drawn in the blackest colours by Xenophon (II. 6. §§ 21–28).

ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς] It is important to bear in mind that intellectual as well as moral excellence is conveyed under the Greek term *ἀρετή*, and that the former rather overshadowed the latter in the popular use of the term. This is why Anytus so unhesitatingly answers that Themistocles was 'a good man,' using the word as an equivalent for a clever or able man, as in the slang sense which it carries among ourselves. By 'virtue' in fact was meant, in popular parlance, that assemblage of qualities which makes a man a capable statesman.

The aim of every ambitious young Greek at this period was to become *δυνατὸς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά*. The scions of wealthy houses did not mind spending money, if only they could acquire the art whereby men manage houses and cities well, and become capable of ruling, and of doing good to themselves and others (Xen. Mem. IV. 2. § 11). The demand created the supply (Prot. 318 E), and the class of Sophists arose, professing to be able to teach men 'virtue.' It was this claim of the Sophists which led Socrates to raise the previous question, whether virtue could be taught.

πειραστικός] i.e. tentative. This term belongs to an elaborate

philosophical division of the works of Plato, which has been preserved to us by Diogenes Laertius (III. §§ 49–51), but which was certainly not devised by himself. Grote (Plato, vol. I. p. 160 note) thinks it 'certain' that he borrowed it from Thrasyllus, to whom the division into tetralogies is ascribed. But the division into tetralogies itself may not have been the work of Thrasyllus. Albinus, the author of an 'Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato' (printed in Hermann's Appendix Platonica), and a contemporary of Galen (born about A. D. 130), after speaking of the division into tetralogies, adds 'of this opinion are Dercyllides and Thrasyllus.' Thrasyllus, then, is not necessarily the author of the division into tetralogies with which his name has been coupled by Diogenes (III. 56).

For the philosophical division, into which the term **πειραστικός** enters as one of the dividing members, see the scheme prefixed. It embraces several works which modern critics regard as spurious.

ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] Contrary to his general habit, Plato, in **70 A** this dialogue, plunges straight into the discussion. But the omission of an introduction, in which the Meno resembles the Cratylus, Philebus, Hipparchus, and Minos, is more apparent than real, since the first two pages (70–71 D) effectively set before us the personality of Meno.

The same question which is here propounded is touched on in the Nicomachaean Ethics in connection with happiness, in which virtue is infinitely the most important ingredient. The ninth chapter of the first book of that treatise commences thus: *Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται.* The drift of Aristotle's discussion is to show that happiness is the outcome of human effort, and not in any special sense the gift of Heaven—least of all the result of chance. The precise question which forms the subject of the Meno is alluded to as an unsettled one by Aristotle in the tenth book (ch. (9), § 6), where, speaking on the question of how virtue is to be acquired, he says, *Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται, οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ.* So far as moral virtue is concerned, Aristotle, while allowing some weight both to nature and teaching, ascribes by far the most important part to training.

διδακτόν] The employment of the neuter adjective with a substantive not of the neuter gender imparts a more abstract air to the question. Translate, 'Whether virtue is a thing to be taught.' Cp. Eur. Hipp. 443 (Dindorf)

Κύπρις γὰρ οὐ φορητόν, ἢν πολλὴ ῥυῇ.

ἐφ' ἱππικῇ] On the reputation of the Thessalians for horsemanship see Laws 625 D; Hipp. Maj. 284 A. Thessaly is a great plain

enclosed by mountains, which adapts it for horses. When Anchimolius invaded Attica, the Peisistratidae cleared the plain of Phalerus, and let loose upon him a body of Thessalian horse, who effected the destruction of himself and the main part of his army (Herod. V. 63).

B **καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ**] *θαυμάζονται* or *θαυμασθήσονται* has to be supplied from *ἐθαυμάζοντο*.

Ἀριστίππου] For Aristippus see the note on Meno prefixed. He is not to be confounded with Aristippus of Cyrene, the disciple of Socrates, and the founder of what is called the Cyrenaic philosophy.

Λαρισαῖοι] The regular construction would require the repetition of the article. For its suppression cp. Apol. 32 B, *ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς* and Phaedo 57 A, *τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων*. Stallbaum.

Γοργίας] A celebrated rhetorician, a native of Leontium in Sicily. He was himself a disciple of Empedocles, to whom the invention of the art of rhetoric is ascribed (Quint. III. 1. §§ 8, 9, Diog. Laert. VIII. §§ 57, 58), and among his pupils were Aeschines (the philosopher, not the orator) and Antisthenes, who left him for Socrates (Diog. Laert. II. § 63, VI. § 1). He composed an Art of Rhetoric, which has not come down to us, though two orations, alleged to be his, are extant. He was deputed as ambassador from his native city to Athens, to implore aid against Syracuse, and produced a fatal effect there on the public mind by his eloquence (Diod. XII. ch. 53. p. 514): at the same time he won for himself disciples in private, from whom he received handsome fees (Hipp. Maj. 282 B, C). He is said to have lived to the age of 107 or more (Cic. De Sen. ch. v; Quint. III. 1. § 9; Diog. Laert. VIII. § 58; Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, p. 494).

τὴν πόλιν] i. e. Larissa, the city of the Aleuadae, a powerful family of nobles among the Thessalians. They are called *Θεσσαλίης βασιλέες* by Herodotus (VII. 6).

ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν] The first of these is a cognate accusative, which falls under the more general head of accusative of the internal object. To append *ἔθος* to *εἴθικεν* does not add any new idea, but merely sets out what was already contained in the action of the verb. In *ὑμᾶς*, on the other hand, we have an accusative of the external object.

C **παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν**] Cp. Apol. 33 B, *ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν*. On Gorgias' undertaking to answer everybody see Gorg. 447 C, D, and for some comments of Cicero on the practice see De Fin. II. ch. 1.

οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ] The way in which this expression comes about is perhaps this: *οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ* first becomes stereotyped as an equiva-

lent of *πᾶς τις* (as below 71 A, *οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται* = *πᾶς τις γελάσεται*), and then the new expression is declined throughout. Here we have it in the dative, where the original expression would have been so. Similarly we have the gen. masc. in Prot. 317 C, the gen. neut. in Theaet. 178 B, the acc. masc. in Phaedo 117 D, *οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων*, and the acc. neut. below 74 D, *καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅ τι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι.*

περιέστηκεν] Cp. Thuc. VI. 24 *τοὐναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ*, 'it turned out quite the opposite to what he expected.'

κινδυνεύει] On the force of *κινδυνεύω* see L. and S. sub voce, 71 A 4 *b*.

μακάριός τις] Cp. Theag. 128 B; Menex. 249 D.

τοσοῦτον δέω . . . εἰδέναι] Stallbaum quotes Axiochus 372 B for the full construction with the article, and a passage of Lucan (Icaromenippus 5) for its omission. With a genitive of the pronoun the omission of the article is the rule. See note on 92 A.

ὡς] = *ὥστε*.

τυγχάνω εἰδώς] Verbs which express being in a state or condition, such as *ἔχω*, and, as here, *τυγχάνω*, are constructed with a participle.

ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς. Here the natural construction would be *ὡς οὐκ* B *εἰδότα*, but it is the well-known tendency of Greek to put into the nominative whatever relates to the subject of the principal verb. It is one of the many forms of the figure called Attraction.

ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα, κ.τ.λ.] A similar difficulty occurs in the Laches, where Socrates declares that, before we can discuss the training of the soul, we must know what virtue is. (See especially 190 B.) Cp. also Rep. I. 354 C, *ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστι, σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὔ.*

τί ἐστι] The phrase *τί ἐστι* is the technical expression for what is called in Logic the 'genus' of a thing; *ποῖόν τι* signifies the 'species,' which consists of 'genus' (*τί*) and 'differentia' (*ποῖον*). We have *ὁποῖόν τι* here because the question is indirect.

τί δαί] A mere formula of transition. Cp. 73 A, B; 77 E; 87 C D.

ἔγωγε] Notice how in Greek dialogue 'yes' and 'no' are implied rather than expressed. This is one of the most marked differences between the modern and the classical languages. Modern Greek uses *μάλιστα* or *ναί* for 'yes,' and *ὄχι* for 'no.'

ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν] 'So that, in point of fact, I am not able.' The infinitive here after *ὥστε* would denote merely the logical consequence.

δοκεῖ γὰρ δή που, κ.τ.λ.] This is a sly intimation that Socrates D does not expect originality from Meno.

ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων] Cp. Apol. 25 C, *εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διός,* **Μέλητε**; 26 E, *ἀλλ', ὦ πρὸς Διός.* See Riddell's Apology, Digest of Idioms § 288.

εἶπον] Imperative from *εἶπα.* Cp. *ἤνεγκα,* Attic, and *ἤλθαμεν,* Alexandrian. This form is noticeable as having the stem of a second aorist and the terminations of a first. Though so rare in classical Greek, it is the prevalent mode of formation in the modern language. *εἶπα* is not to be confounded with what is sometimes called 'the Homeric Aorist,' *ἶξε, ἄξον* (imper.), *βήσετο, δύσετο,* etc., which have the terminations of a second aorist appended to the stem of a first.

φανῇς . . . εἰδώς] 'Be found to know.' With an infinitive the meaning would be 'seem to know.'

E **αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή**] The article is omitted with **ἀρετή** in accordance with the rule that the subject takes the article and the predicate not. Stallbaum.

τοὺς μὲν φίλους, κ.τ.λ.] This is the definition of justice which Polemarchus endeavours to uphold in the first book of the Republic (332 D). Socrates maintains against it that it cannot be just to harm anybody (335 B–D).

οἰκεῖν] = *διοικεῖν.* See 73 A. Cp. Xen. Mem. I. 2. § 64 *πολεῖς τε καὶ οἴκους εὖ οἰκοῦσι.*

καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος] We have here an unusual, but at the same time perfectly natural grammatical phenomenon—namely, adjectives of different genders agreeing with the same substantive.

72 A **καθ' ἑκάστην γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**] The whole answer is given from the point of view of Gorgias. Aristotle, evidently with an eye to this passage, says that his enumeration of different virtues is preferable to the vague generality of a definition of virtue in the abstract. See Pol. I. ch. 13 *καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων. πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων.*

B **οὐσίας ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστι**] Riddell (Digest § 229) classes this as a case of what he calls 'binary structure,' as though the words *ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστι* simply repeated *οὐσίας* in another form. But perhaps we have here the same construction as above 72 A, *ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστι,* both of them being in accordance with the common Greek idiom by which the subject of the dependent clause is attracted into the principal one.

The word *οὐσία* denotes the being or essence of a thing, that is, the collection of attributes without which it would not be what it is. The Romans cared so little for the subtleties of thought that they had no word to express this idea until the term 'essentia' was coined

by Plautus (see Quint. II. 14. § 2; III. 6. § 23 ed. Bonnell; there is some doubt as to the reading of the name). 'Essentia' was used by Cicero, and after him by Fabianus, an elegant writer contemporary with Seneca; but it was always regarded as a monstrosity by the Romans (Sen. Epist. 58 ad in.). Seneca complains of the inadequacy of the Roman language to deal with the conceptions of Plato.

κἂν εἰ] In this compound, however originated, the *ἄν* has lost its force. The meaning of the expression is 'even though.' It may be followed by the indicative, as here, or by the optative, as in Rep. III. 408 B. Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. V. (9), § 13; Pol. I. 3. § 3. **C**

ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι] In order to account for the nominative, a personal *δοκεῖ* has to be supplied here from the impersonal *δοκεῖ* preceding. Cp. Apol. 25 A, B, where the ellipse is more manifest owing to the change of number. **D**

τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω. We have here the construction *λέγειν τινά τι* only with a neuter object. Any word, or collection of words, when cited merely as such, is neuter in Greek. This is called in Logic the 'suppositio materialis' of a word or phrase. Thus *τὸ ἄνθρωπος*, the word 'man,' and here *τὸ τῇ αὐτῇ*, the expression 'the same.' Translate, 'By the expression "the same," I mean this.' **E**

πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι] In the nominative, because referring to the subject of the verb *διαφέρει*. Cp. note on *ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς*, 71 B.

δικαιοσύνη, κ.τ.λ.] The modern reader is often inclined to feel surprise and impatience at the platitudes of Plato. He should bear in mind that Dialectic was a game of which the laws were exactly enforced. One of the interlocutors was not allowed at his own discretion to assume the identity of one form of expression with another. Thus, if the point to be proved were some proposition relating to *λώπιον*, and the questioner had already extracted from his opponent a confession of the point at issue with respect to *ἱμάτιον*, it required an additional question and answer to effect the transition, though the one was admittedly a mere synonym of the other (Arist. Sophist. Elench. 6. § 3; Top. I. 7. § 1). **73 B**

εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι] This seems at first sight a case of *ὕστερον πρότερον*: but the *καί* is probably corrective—'or rather.' Socrates is sure that Meno's telling would be equivalent to his recollecting what Gorgias had said. **C**

τί αὐτό φησι] *αὐτό* is put vaguely for 'the thing in question.' This usage is common enough both in Plato and Aristotle. Cp. below 86 C ad fin. *πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν*; where *αὐτῷ* stands for *ἀρετῇ*. Cp. Rep. IV. 430 C; Apol. 21 B, *ἐπὶ ζήτησιν*

αὐτοῦ: Ar. Eth. Nic. X. (9), § 14, also X. (9), § 9, where the plural *αὐτά* is used in the same loose way.

ἄρχειν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] This was the specious prospect with which the Sophists dazzled the imagination of ambitious youths. See note on *ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς* in the title of the dialogue.

D **ἄρχειν οὧ τε εἶναι**] The construction is slightly irregular, as the dative presupposes *παιδὶ καὶ δούλῳ*.

ἔτι γάρ] The *γάρ* here introduces a new point, instead of supporting the former one.

E **πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις**] If there is anything calculated to make us believe in a real growth of the human faculties within historical times, it is the extreme difficulty under which Socrates always labours in knocking into the heads of his hearers the meaning of a general idea. Even the intelligent Theaetetus makes the same false start as Meno, and begins with an enumeration of various branches of knowledge, when he is asked for a definition of knowledge in general (Theaet. 146 C, D).

74 A **μεγαλοπρέπεια**] We have now had mentioned the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice—a division which plays an important part in the Republic, and underlies Cicero's treatise De Officiis. It is remarkable that the one virtue named in addition to these should be *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. There is a certain dramatic propriety, as Stallbaum points out, about the mention of this quality in the mouth of a disciple of Gorgias, who taught his pupils to answer *ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς*. But it occupies pretty nearly the same post of honour where there is no such dramatic motive discernible (below 88 A; Rep. III. 402 C). *μεγαλοπρέπεια* is a conception peculiar to the honour-loving Greek, for which we have no real equivalent in English. As defined and specialised by Aristotle, it means 'expenditure on a large scale with propriety' (Eth. Nic. IV. (2), § 1): but this is no clue to the vaguer use of the term by Plato (see Rep. VI. 486 A). Socrates in Xenophon speaks of the attribute of magnificence (*τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές*, Mem. III. 10. § 5) revealing itself in the features. For a sketch of a *μεγαλοπρεπής* see Herodotus VI. 121, 122.

διὰ πάντων] 'Running through all.' See L. and S. and for Riddell's view Digest of Idioms § 112.

B **προσβιβάσαι**] Light is thrown on the meaning of this word by its use in Xenophon, Mem. I. 2. § 17 *τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας*, 'winning them over to their theory.' *προβιβάζειν* would mean 'to advance.' See Xen. Mem. I. 5. § 1.

εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο] Notice that the indefinite *τις* takes the opta-

tive, whereas when greater definiteness is imparted by the substitution of *αὐτῷ*, lower down, the mood is changed into the indicative. The superposition of three conditional clauses, *εἰ . . . εἰ . . . εἰ*, before we reach the apodosis at *εἶπες*, is very remarkable. Stallbaum. For two such clauses cp. Rep. 331 C and Theaet. 147 A.

ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως] Cp. Prot. 318 B, *ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως*: Aristoph. **D**
Acharn. 345 *ἀλλὰ μή μοι πρόφασιν*. Stallbaum.

οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅ τι οὐ] See note on *οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ*, 70 C.

ἐναντία ὄντα] This is in agreement with *τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα* above, the intervening clause, *καὶ φῄς*, *κ.τ.λ.* being parenthetical.

εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω] *ὅτι*, unlike the English conjunction, **75 A**
'that,' may be used with the direct as well as with the oblique narration. Cp. below C, *εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται*.

τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ταὐτόν. 'That which is the same thing in all of them.' The article is already contained in *ταὐτόν*: but the product of crasis has become so much an independent word that it is again prefixed. Stallbaum. Cp. *τὸ θάτερον*, Soph. 255 D.

μελέτη] This is equivalent in meaning, if not in etymology, to the Latin word 'meditatio.' Both words are used of an actor or orator getting up what he has to say, and may sometimes be rendered by the English word 'rehearsal.'

Μή] Deprecatory. Riddell, Digest § 136. **B**

βούλει οὖν χαρίσωμαι] Cp. Phaedo 79 A, *Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει ;*

ἱκανῶς σοι] So also Phaedo 71 D, *ἱκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὔ ;*

ἀγαπῴην] This Attic form of the optative is preferred in vowel verbs to the ordinary ending in *-οιμι*, *κ.τ.λ.* It is somewhat remarkable that though the verb *ἀγαπᾶν* was common in classical Greek it was left to Jewish writers (Philo and St. Paul) to give circulation to *ἀγάπη*.

εὖῃθες] Because involving the logical fault known as 'ignotum **C**
per ignotius' or 'per aeque ignotum,' i. e. defining a thing by something less known, or no better known than itself. Socrates tacitly accepts Meno's correction. See 79 D, *ἀπεβάλλομεν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν*.

ἐριστικῶν] The *ἐριστικός* is defined by Aristotle to be one who argues with a view to victory rather than to truth (Sophist. Elench. XI. §§ 5, 6). The *ἀγωνιστικός* is much the same (see Theaet. 146 C ad fin.).

δεῖ] The indicative marks a transition from a mere supposition **D**
to the actual case in hand, for which the way is paved by the introduction of the words *ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ*.

διαλεκτικώτερον] That is, in a way more conducive to the attainment of truth, the proper end of *διαλεκτική*. Cp. Arist. Top. VIII.

II. § 2 *Δυσκολαίνοντες οὖν ἀγωνιστικὰς καὶ οὐ διαλεκτικὰς ποιοῦνται τὰς διατριβάς.*

δι' ἐκείνων, κ.τ.λ.] We have here in effect the logical rule that a definition should be clearer than the thing defined. The object of a definition is to explain the meaning of one term by the use of others; but this object will be defeated, if the others selected are no more intelligible, or less intelligible, than the original one. See Aldrich, ch. I. § 8 ad fin. 'Ut per se clarior sit et notior definito: alias non explicat omnino.'

ὁ ἐρωτώμενος] 'The person interrogated.' But the same person is indicated as by the term *ὁ ἐρόμενος*, 'the questioner,' above. For the objector's doubts would be satisfied by a series of questions to which he would be expected to respond.

τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι] This form of expression occurs several times in the Meno. Below E; also 76 A, D; 88 A. Cp. Phaedo 103 C, *θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν*: Crat. 399 D, *ψυχὴν γάρ που καὶ σῶμα καλοῦμεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*: Prot. 358 D, *καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον*. Cp. Theaet. 163 E ad in. *μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι*;

It shows the wariness with which the dialectical wrestlers were wont to grapple with one another, that the one should demand of the other his formal assent to the existence of ever so common a notion before he proceeded to argue about it. We should say bluntly, 'Do you admit the existence of so and so?' But the Greeks, with a finer logical faculty, were content with the recognition of an idea in men's minds as indicated by language.

E **Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο**] 'Might dissent from us.' For a somewhat burlesque specimen of Prodicus' skill in distinguishing shades of meaning in words see Prot. 337 A–C.

Prodicus was a native of the island of Ceos, a fellow-countryman of the Poet Simonides (Prot. 339 E). Socrates at one time derived instruction from him (see below 96 D, with which cp. Crat. 384 B: Char. 163 D; Prot. 341 A, and Xen. Mem. II. 1. § 21). He is said to have amassed a great fortune by his lectures (Hipp. Maj. 282 C). He is best known as the author of 'The Choice of Hercules,' related in Xenophon's Memorabilia.

οὐδὲν ποικίλον] Cp. Gorg. 491 D, *Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί*. Cp. also Xen. Mem. II. 3. § 10.

76 A **ταῦτα τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίαις**] *οὗτος* is sometimes used to indicate that a thing is well-known. Cp. below 80 A, *ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ*.

ἀποκρίνεσθαι] Epexegetical of *πράγματα*, explaining the nature of the trouble. Cp. 80 A ad fin., *νάρκᾶν*.

B **ἐρασταί σοι**] What Socrates is made to say in joke, with

questionable taste on the part of Plato, is stated in earnest by Xenophon (Anab. II. 6. § 28).

κατέγνωκας] *καταγιγνώσκειν τινός* may be used of favourable as well as unfavourable judgments. Cp. Xen. Oec. II. §§ 1, 18 with Mem. I. 3. § 10. C

εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν] In the Theages (128 B) Socrates is made to declare that the one art of which he was really master, was the art of love (*τὰ ἐρωτικά*), with allusion to the magnetic influence which he exercised over his disciples. That this way of speaking was characteristic of the real Socrates is evident from the similar language put into his mouth by Xenophon (Mem. II. 6. § 28).

λέγετε] The plural shows that the opinion is ascribed to the school of Gorgias in general.

κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα] Gorgias was himself a disciple of Empedocles (Quint. III. 1. § 8; Diog. Laert. VIII. § 58). Empedocles was famous as a philosopher, poet, orator, physician, and magician. He was a native of Acragas in Sicily, and a member of a wealthy family. Romantic legends have collected round his name, and little is known with certainty of his life. His father's name is usually given as Meton, though some say Exaenetus, and some Archinomus. He is variously stated to have been a disciple of Pythagoras, of Parmenides, of Xenophanes. The invention of rhetoric is ascribed to him by Aristotle, as that of dialectic to Zeno. His philosophy was embodied in hexameter verses, of which some fragments have been preserved to us. His style was lofty and full of metaphors. He flourished in Olympiad 84 (B.C. 444–0). See his life by Diogenes Laertius, book VIII. §§ 51–77. Empedocles' theory of vision assimilates sight to smell. Just as in smell there is an actual contact of particles with the organ of sense, so Empedocles supposed it to be in the case of sight.

ἔφη Πίνδαρος] See Boeckh's Pindar, vol. III. p. 597, fragments— D

σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ζαθέων ἱερῶν ὁμώνυμε πάτερ,
κτίστορ Αἴτνας.

ἔστι γὰρ χρόα] For the same theory see Timaeus 67 C, where colours are compared to flames radiating from the object.

τραγική] 'High-flown,' 'pompous.' There is perhaps an allusion to the style of Empedocles. Diogenes Laertius speaks of a 'tragic inflation' as characteristic of the whole man (VIII. § 70). For the expression cp. Rep. III. 413 B ad in. E

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν] We certainly seem to require *αὕτη* here in contrast with the *ἐκείνη* following. Without it, we must understand *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν* to mean 'But it *is* not better,' as opposed to the 'It seems better,' which is implied in *ἀρέσκει σοι*. For the phrase *ὡς*

ἐμαυτὸν πείθω cp. Gorg. 453 B. ἐκείνη refers to the amended definition of figure as 'the termination of a solid.'

ἀλλ' εἰ περιμείναις] The εἰ merely repeats the former one. Render εἰ μή above 'if you had not.'

77 A προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω] Cp. Symp. 210 A; Rep. VII. 533 A.

ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι] 'But I am afraid I shall not be able to tell you many things of the sort.' The whole phrase recurs in Rep. VI. 506 D. For ὅπως μή followed by the indicative cp. Phaedo 77 B and Soph. Oed. T. 1074, 5, where we have the verb of fearing expressed—

δέδοιχ' ὅπως
μὴ 'κ τῆς σιωπῆς τῆσδ' ἀναῤῥήξει κακά.

Similarly Aristoph. Knights 112. See also Riddell, Digest § 59.

ἀποδοῦναι] A metaphor from paying a debt. Cp. Symp. 194 D, ἀποδοὺς οὖν ἑκάτερος τῷ θεῷ οὕτως ἤδη διαλεγέσθω.

ὅλην] That is, a logical whole, not divided into its component species—courage, temperance, etc. Elsewhere Plato aptly compares a bad logical division to hacking a quarter of meat instead of jointing it (Phaedrus 265 E).

B δύνασθαι] It has been conjectured that the poet meant this absolutely, in the sense of 'power.' But as we know nothing of the passage except from Plato, we had better accept his interpretation. We have a similar construction below 78 A, ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι, where two verbs requiring different cases are coupled with the same noun. For the construction δύνασθαι τι cp. ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, below § 94 B ad fin.

πορίζεσθαι] Supply αὐτά. Cp. last note.

C λέγεις] It is more usual to find φῄς used thus parenthetically. See Phaedo 59 C; Theaet. 151 E.

ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ] Cp. Symp. 204 E, ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῷ.

78 A κακοδαίμονας] κακοδαίμων means a man who is attended with an evil genius; hence 'unfortunate.' The word is used also for the evil genius itself. See the appalling story of Cassius of Parma in Valerius Maximus, bk. I. ch. 7, De Somniis § 7. A belief in spirits attendant upon human beings was common to the Jews, Greeks, and Romans. There are two passages in the New Testament, which seem to imply it, Matt. xviii. 10; Acts xii. 15. Among the Romans the guardian-spirit of a man was called his Genius, that of a woman her Juno (Tibullus IV. 6. 1; 13. 15). The conception was turned to a religious use in the later Paganism. Epictetus finely says: 'So that when ye have shut to the doors, and made it dark

within, remember never to say that ye are alone; for neither are ye. For God is within, and your Genius is within; and what need have they of light to behold what ye are doing?' (Arrian, Epict. bk. I. ch. 14 ad fin.).

κτᾶσθαι] See note on *δύνασθαι*, 77 B.

βούλεσθαι] Supply *κινδυνεύει.* B

τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] It might be remarked on this that all men desire the apparent good, but differ in the degree in which their view of it approximates to, or recedes from, the real good.

Ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] Notice the hyperbaton in this sentence, C
i. e. the displacement of the natural order of words, the emphatic part being brought in last for the sake of giving it a greater prominence. Riddell, Digest § 309.

καὶ χρυσίον . . . κτᾶσθαι] *κτᾶσθαι* might be coordinate with *ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον*, and *λέγω* parenthetical. See note on *λέγεις*, 77 B. But it is perhaps simpler to take *λέγω* as directly governing *κτᾶσθαι*, 'And the getting of gold and silver too I mean.'

ἄττα] Attic neut. pl. of the indefinite pronoun *τις*, for *τινα*; to be distinguished from *ἅττα*, neut. pl. of *ὅστις*, 88 B.

τι] If *τι* is substantival, we must regard *τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως* as in D
apposition to it; but probably it should be taken adverbially—'at all.'

αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς] Meno had made out virtue to lie in the procuring of worldly goods; but Plato imparts still greater invidiousness to his position by representing him as confounding virtue with these lower goods themselves.

ἐκπορίζουσα] The participle is attracted into the gender of *ἀρετή*, E
which stands nearest to it in the sentence. In sense it belongs to *πόρῳ* preceding.

ἀπορία] This word generally signifies physical incapacity. Here it means the moral incapacity of the virtuous man to degrade himself.

μόριον] Logically a part, as being one of the constituent species 79 A
of a genus.

παίζεις πρός με] Cp. Xen. Cyr. VI. 1. § 6 *Οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτα ἔπαιζον σπουδῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, and Eur. H. F. 952 *παίζει πρὸς ἡμᾶς δεσπότης, ἢ μαίνεται*; Stallbaum.

τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον] *τοῦτο* refers really to *δικαιοσύνη*, but is B
attracted into the gender of *μόριον*. See note on *ἐκπορίζουσα*, above 78 E. For a somewhat different instance cp. Cic. Phil. II. 22 'Pompeium, quod imperii Populi Romani decus ac lumen fuit.'

ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ] Supply *τις*. For its omission cp. 97 A; also Char. 167 B; Euthyd. 284 A. Similarly *τινα* is omitted below, 81 D; Apol. 29 A, *δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.*

C **δεῖται οὖν σοι**] The impersonal passive construction is rare.

τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κ.τ.λ.] 'For this is what one is saying, when one says that every action which is attended with justice is virtue.'

ἀλλ' οἵει τινά] To attempt to define a thing by means of its own species is a kind of 'circulus in definiendo,' since to define a thing by its species is to define it by itself. The procedure, however, more directly offends against the principle laid down by Aristotle in the Organon—that no definition can state the essence of a thing, if its elements are not prior and better known (Top. VI. 4. § 2). Now the species of a genus, though they may be better known to us, are not better known universally; they are, in fact, intelligible only through the genus, so that we are involved in an 'ignotum per ignotius.'

D **ἀπεβάλλομεν**] See 75 D.

E **τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς**] The question—*τί ἐστιν ἀρετή*;—is here latent, to the predicate of which, *τί*, the participle is accommodated. Cp. below 87 C, *ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν*, where the thing spoken of is *ἡ ἀρετή*. Similarly Prot. 354 C, *Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν*;

80 A **καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν**] Cp. Theaet. 149 A, *ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν*.

ἀτεχνῶς] 'Quite,' 'absolutely.' Cp. Apol. 17 D and passim. The word is of specially frequent occurrence in the slightly colloquial language of the Apology.

ὁμοιότατος] This striking metaphor deserves to be compared with that of the magnet in the Ion (533 D, E), by which Plato illustrates the secondary inspiration of students of poetry.

τό τε εἶδος] Similarly Alcibiades, in the Symposium, rallies Socrates on his personal appearance (215 A, B), and Theodorus tells him that the youthful Theaetetus is not handsome, but like himself (Theaet. 143 E), *οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων*. It was a permitted subject of jesting. When a man is very ugly he becomes proud of the distinction!

νάρκῃ] The electric eel or torpedo. Pliny says of it: 'etiam procul et e longinquo, vel si hasta virgave attingatur, quamvis praevalidos lacertos torpescere, quamlibet ad cursum veloces alligari pedes' (Nat. Hist. XXXII. (2), ed. Jan).

πεποιηκέναι, ναρκᾶν] *ναρκᾶν* is intransitive, as in the line preceding. It is epexegetical of *τοιοῦτόν τι* only, not of *τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι*. Cp. 76 A, *ἀποκρίνεσθαι*; Crito 45 C, *σαυτὸν προδοῦναι*.

B **οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ' ἀποδημῶν**] On the fondness of Socrates for Athens see Crito 52 B; Phaedrus 230 D. On the treatment that he might have met in another state see Apol. 37 C, D.

ὀλίγου] Cp. Apol. 17 A, *ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην*.

αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα] Pliny testifies to the opposite: 'Novit torpedo vim suam, ipsa non torpescens.' Stallbaum. C

τοὺς ἄλλους] Masc., because, though speaking of the torpedo, he is thinking of himself.

ἐντύχοις] On the optative subjoined to an indicative sentence see Riddell, Digest § 74. D

ἐριστικὸν λόγον] Grote says in a note (Plato, vol. II. p. 16), 'If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by so doing they rendered service to the interests of philosophy;' and in the text, 'Here we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for the subsequent three centuries—What is the criterion of truth?' E

κατάγεις] It is difficult to see why this particular word should be used here. Perhaps we may render it 'you are bringing home to us.' L. and S. explain it as a metaphor from spinning, like Latin 'deducere filum.'

ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι ζητεῖν] By search is meant mental search—the process of evoking knowledge out of one's own inner consciousness. Plato accepts one of the horns of the dilemma, maintaining that one really knows the thing, having seen it in a prior state of existence. Things thus seen are forgotten, yet not so far as to be beyond recognition in case of their being alighted upon, so that search is always a hopeful task.

Πίνδαρος] The lines below are assigned by Boeckh (Pindar, vol. III. p. 623) to the Θρῆνοι of Pindar. 81 B

οἷσι γὰρ ἂν . . . δέξεται] = *παρ' ὧν ἂν δέξηται.*

πένθεος] Here = 'guilt,' which sooner or later brings suffering. *πένθος* is another form of *πάθος*, as *βένθος* of *βάθος*, *θάμβος* of *τάφος*.

ἥρωες] The ω is shortened before the following vowel, so that the word scans as a dactyl. C

Ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχή] The logical order is—*Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ὅ τι ἡ ψυχή, ἅτε ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα, κ.τ.λ., οὐ μεμάθηκεν.*

ἑωρακυῖα] Notice this word. What we call 'learning' is merely recollection, while the origin of knowledge is in an intellectual intuition of the truth of things. In the *κόσμος νοητός* things are visible to the eye of the mind, which are mere abstractions in the world of sense.

ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.] On the unity and continuity of nature see Cicero, de Div. II. 14 'quae, ut uno consensu juncta sit et continens, quod video placuisse physicis, eisque maxime, qui omne, quod esset, unum esse dixerunt.' Cp. also Verg. Geor. IV. 219–27; Aen. VI. 724–51.

D ἀναμνησθέντα] Supply *τινα*. See note on 79 B.

τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν] This is one of the most famous of Plato's doctrines. Cp. Phaedo 72 E–77 A. Cicero (Tusc. Disp. I. 24) admits the partial truth of it in an interesting passage, which will serve as an introduction to the coming interlude in the dialogue: 'Habet (sc. animus hominis) primum memoriam, et eam infinitam, rerum innumerabilium; quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitae. Nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur Menon, pusionem quemdam Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. Ad ea sic ille respondet, ut puer; et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut gradatim respondens eodem perveniat, quo si geometrica didicisset. Ex quo effici vult Socrates ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari.'

St. Augustine too, no mean metaphysician, accepts the substantial truth of Plato's doctrine without drawing his inference as to a previous state of existence. He says (Conf. X. 11): 'Quocirca invenimus, nihil esse aliud discere ista, quorum non per sensus haurimus imagines, sed sine imaginibus, sicuti sunt, per se ipsa intus cernimus, nisi ea quae passim atque indisposite memoria continebat, cogitando quasi colligere, atque animadvertendo curare, ut tanquam ad manum posita in ipsa memoria, ubi sparsa prius et neglecta latitabant, jam familiari intentioni facile occurrant.' St. Augustine had studied Platonism through the medium of a translation (Conf. VII. 9).

οὗτος . . . ὅδε] *οὗτος* is here used, like 'iste,' as the pronoun of the 2nd person, 'that of yours;' *ὅδε* means 'this of mine.' We have a clear instance of the same use in Homer Il. VIII. 109, where Diomede says to Nestor:

τούτω μὲν θεράποντε κομείτων, τώδε δὲ νῶϊ
Τρωσὶν ἐφ' ἱπποδάμοις ἰθύνομεν.

Here *τούτω* refers to the horses of the person spoken to, and *τώδε* to those of the speaker.

ἀργοὺς ποιήσειε] Cp. Phaedo 85 C, D, where Simmias insists on the duty of speculative inquiry, even if certainty be unattainable.

E Ναὶ, ὦ Σώκρατες] Meno accepts the doctrine of metempsychosis without surprise, and demurs only to that of *ἀνάμνησις*. Meno, we may remember, was imbued, through Gorgias, with the teaching of Empedocles, who held the doctrine of metempsychosis at least as firmly as Plato. Witness what he says of himself:

ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κουρός τε, κόρη τε,
θάμνος τ', οἰωνός τε, καὶ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἔμπυρος ἰχθύς.

(Diog. Laert. VIII. § 77, Tauchnitz.) Ritter and Preller read *καὶ εἰν ἁλὶ ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς*, which saves the line from absurdity. Empedocles is hardly likely to have said that he had been a broiled fish in his time.

οὕτως] 'As you say.' Cp. note on 81 D above; also Apol. 26 E, *ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ*, 'Do I seem to you, as you say?' Rep. II. 370 A, *Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾷον ἢ ἐκείνως*, where *οὕτω* means 'in the way you suggest.'

μοι] 'Pray.' Ethic dative. **82 A**

πολλῶν ἀκολούθων] A sign of Meno's wealth.

ὁντινα βούλει] In proof of the genuineness of the experiment, as **B** a conjurer asks for *any* hat from the audience.

Ἕλλην μέν] We may suppose an ellipse of some counterbalancing clause with *δέ*—'a Greek in race and language, but not educated.' Cp. 86 C, *Καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν*; 89 C, *Καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει μὲν ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι*. This isolated use of *μέν* is especially frequent with verbs of thinking, e.g. *οἶμαι μέν*, Phil. 63 B, Laws 625 C, 633 D, 676 B; *δοκῶ μέν*, Soph. 242 B; *ἔοικας μέν*, Laws 629 D; and with pronouns, e.g. *Ἐγὼ μέν*, Gorg. 506 E, Rep. 499 C; *ἐμοὶ μέν*, Crat. 428 E; *ὅδε μέν*, Laws 629 B; *τούτου μέν*, Apol. 21 D; *τοῦτο μέν*, Phil. 49 D, Laws 628 A.

ὁπότερα] For the pl. cp. Soph. 222 B; Euthyd. 275 E.

Εἰπὲ δή μοι, κ.τ.λ.] We may now suppose Socrates gradually to construct the following diagram on the sand:



τοιοῦτον. The figure ABCD. **C**

Ἔστιν . . . . ἔχον] Notice the analytic form. Cp. 84 A, *ἐστὶ βαδίζων*.

ἄλλο τι] In full *ἄλλο τι ἤ*, a common interrogatory formula in Plato. Cp. 97 A. It is practically equivalent to the Latin 'nonne.'

There is an avoidance of bluntness about it characteristic of the polite Hellenic mind. To exhaust the negative is an indirect way of asserting the affirmative. Greek abounds in such negative terms as *οὐκ ἀγεννές, οὐκ ἄδηλον.*

τὸ χωρίον] The figure AEFD.

83 A **ἑτέραν τοσαύτην**] The line DG.

ἀπὸ ταύτης δή] The line AG.

B **ἀπ' αὐτῆς**] This is speaking inclusively, as the line AG itself is one of the four.

τουτί] The square AHIG.

ταυτὶ τέτταρα] ABCD, DCKG, BHLC, CLIK.

C **τεττάρων γάρ**] In full—*τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ποδῶν χωρίον ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα ποδῶν χωρίον*: 'Four times a space of four feet is a space of sixteen feet, is it not?'

τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησί] The original line AD. Notice the Ionic form *ἡμισέας*. See L. and S.

τοῦδε] The original square ABCD.

τούτου] The whole figure AHIG.

τοσαύτης] The line AD. Observe that the second of the terms compared has been attracted into the case of the first. Riddell, Digest § 168.

D **τοσησδί**] The line AG.

E **τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης**] DM, the half of DG.

οἵδε] AD, which was originally supposed to be two feet.

ὁ δέ] The line DM.

ἐνθένδε, κ.τ.λ.] *οἵδε* is now the line AB, and *ὁδέ* the line BN.

84 B **προὔργου**] Crasis for *πρὸ ἔργου*. For its use cp. below 87 A.

τότε δὲ ῥᾳδίως] This is a hit at Meno for his readiness to preach about virtue. See 80 B.

D **τετράπουν τοῦτο**] The original square ABCD.

τουτί] DCKG.

τρίτον τόδε] CLIK.

τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε] BHLC.

E **τὸ ὅλον τόδε**] AHIG.

τοῦδε] ABCD.

Οὐκοῦν . . . . γραμμή] 'Have we not then a line here?' *αὕτη γραμμή* must not be taken as 'this line.' In Phil. 16 C we may construe *ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν*, 'delivered this as their utterance.' In Gorg. 489 B, *Οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν* and 505 C, *Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος*, the *οὗτος* is exclamatory, 'Here's a man who, etc.' Cp. Rep. 506 B, where *Οὗτος ἀνήρ* is in the second person, meaning 'You fellow there!'

85 A **τέτταρες αὗται**] BD, DK, KL, LB.

τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων] The four squares bisected by the four lines.

ἥμισυ ἑκάστου] The triangles BCD, DCK, KCL, LCB.

τηλικαῦτα] Of the size of BCD.

ἐν τούτῳ] In DBLK.

τὰ δὲ τέτταρα, κ.τ.λ.] 'What (multiple) of two is four?'

Τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται] *τόδε* is DBLK. This question is **B** abrupt as compared with the preceding ones, though the leap is not more than a boy's intelligence would be sure to take unaided. Schleiermacher supposes a lacuna in the text, which he ingeniously supplies thus:

ΣΩ. *Τόδε οὖν ποσαπλάσιον γίγνεται τούτου;*
ΠΑΙ. *Διπλάσιον.*
ΣΩ. *Τοῦτο δὲ πηλίκον ἦν;*
ΠΑΙ. *Τετράπουν.*
ΣΩ. *Τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν;*

The eye of the copyist might easily glance on from *ποσαπλάσιον* to *ποσάπουν*: but, on the other hand, the mind of Plato might easily have glanced over the missing link in the chain of argument.

σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος] Socrates says this as insisting on his position that the truths of science are latent in the minds of all. This is true of an *a priori* science like geometry, the truths of which are such that the mind cannot but recognise them when they are put before it.

τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι] We seem able to dispense either with the words *περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ* or with *περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν*. Stallbaum tries to vindicate the passage from the charge of redundancy by taking the first *περί* in close connection with *εἰδότι*, and translating thus: 'Itaque qui ignorat aliquid, quidquid illud sit, is tamen de eo quod ignorat, rectas verasque opiniones habere potest.' He takes *περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ* as a periphrasis for *περὶ ὁτουοῦν*. This seems somewhat forced, and perhaps the true explanation is that Plato, having started the question as a hypothetical case, *περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ*, drives home the apparent contradiction at the end by representing it as an existing fact, *περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν*—'Then in one who does not know, and about things which he is not supposed to know, do there exist true opinions about those things which as a matter of fact he does not know?'

εἰληφὼς εἴη] The periphrastic form of the perfect optative, which **D** is invariable in the middle and passive, is usual in Plato in the active also. Other writers have it too; thus Hdt. I. 210, *ὦ βασιλεῦ, μὴ εἴη ἀνὴρ Πέρσης γεγονὼς ὅστις τοι ἐπιβουλεύσει*; III. 64, *ἀπολωλεκὼς εἴη*.

ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη] It appears from the words that are put **86 B** into the mouth of Socrates below, that Plato was himself conscious

of the weakness of this remarkable argument for the immortality of the soul. It breaks down from the first, for there is no notice taken of the possible supposition that the boy got the knowledge on coming into this life, that is to say, that it is part of his human nature. If necessary truth be the result of the structure of the human faculties, this *a priori* knowledge is got at the moment when the faculties are inherited. Neither is any notice taken of the position, which is a possible one, that the soul may have pre-existed, and yet not from eternity.

καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.] For a similar distinction between essential and non-essential points of credence see Phaedo 114 D.

C **οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά**] Of the same force as *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*, 'however,' 'not but that.' 'After *οὐ μέντοι* is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἀλλά,' Riddell, Digest § 155. The instance given in the Student's Greek Grammar makes this very clear—*ὁ ἵππος μικροῦ ἐκεῖνον ἐξετραχήλισεν· οὐ μὴν (ἐξετραχήλισεν) ἀλλὰ ἐπέμεινεν ὁ Κῦρος.*

διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ] See note on *διδακτόν*, 70 A, and on *τί αὐτό φησι*, 73 C.

D **εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν**] The *οὐ* may be supposed to coalesce with the *διδακτόν* so as to form a negative term. Otherwise we might expect *μή*, as below 87 B, *εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή*. For *οὐ* after *εἴτε* cp. Rep. I. 354 C.

ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἦς] Cp. the words of Philo, himself a Platonist —'*Αναμφιβόλως καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐλευθερός ἐστι* (II. 452. § 7, Tauchnitz).

E **ποῖόν τι**] See note on *τί ἐστι*, 71 B.

εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλά] 'At all events then.' Cp. Rep. VI. 509 C; Riddell, Digest § 20.

λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, κ.τ.λ.] On *τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* see note *τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ*, 72 E.

The passage which follows is the only difficulty in the Meno, and perhaps an insoluble one. The key to it has been lost for want of the diagram which should accompany it. Taking the words exactly as they stand in the text, they seem to run as follows:

'By "hypothetically" I mean something of this kind. In a question of geometry, when one has asked, for instance, about a figure, whether it be possible for a given figure to be inscribed as a triangle in a given circle, a man might say, "I do not yet know whether your figure is of the kind required, but, as an hypothesis, I think the following consideration will help us. If this figure be of such a kind that when a man has described a figure on the given line of it, he falls short by a figure similar to the figure itself which

has been described thereon, one consequence seems to me to ensue, and again another, if it be impossible for it to be treated thus. Hypothetically, then, I am willing to tell you the result with regard to the inscribing of it in the circle, whether it be impossible or not."'

As to the meaning of these words, the following explanation may be attempted for want of a better:

Socrates wishes merely to illustrate the nature of a hypothesis, and he supposes a student to be asked whether it be possible for a given triangle to be inscribed in a given circle. The student replies that if it be a right-angled triangle, the case is one, and if it be not, the case is another, and would have to be considered separately. But, in order to make the hypothesis more elaborate, the student, instead of speaking directly of a right-angled triangle, attempts to describe it by one of its properties. Unfortunately this property is not so distinctly stated as to be peculiar to the right-angled triangle.

Let ABC be a right-angled triangle. To let fall a perpendicular upon BC from the vertex A amounts to describing a triangle upon the line AC (or upon AD itself, see note on *τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμήν*, 87 A), and the effect of such a perpendicular is that the remainder ABD is a triangle similar to ADC. To render the description peculiar to the right-angled triangle, it should be stated that the triangles into which it is divided are not merely similar to each other, but to the whole triangle (Euclid VI. 8). As a matter of mathematical fact, a circle can be described round any triangle whatever (Euclid IV. 5). But the question is not whether a triangle generally can be inscribed in a circle, but whether a given triangle can be inscribed in a circle of a given magnitude. To decide this is easier in the case of the right-angled triangle than in that of a triangle of another kind. For as the angle in a semi-circle is always a right angle, we have only to measure the length of the base and compare it with the diameter of the circle.



χωρίου] Properly 'space,' 'area.' But as every definite portion

of space must have some shape, it is permissible to render it 'figure.'

87 A **τόδε τὸ χωρίον**] Stallbaum's contention that these words refer to the square previously described by Socrates seems put out of court by the words immediately preceding, *τόνδε τὸν κύκλον*. Socrates had not already described a circle in the sand. Notice that the *τοῦτο* following refers to the same thing as *τόδε* above, only that the point of view has shifted from the first to the second person. See note on *οὗτος . . . ὅδε*, 81 D, above.

εἰ μέν ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.] We have no clause with *δέ* following, but the force of one is got from the words below, *καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατον*.

τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμήν] These words admit of being construed 'the line given here,' in which case they might be referred to the perpendicular AD.

παρατείναντα] Supply *τινα*. Cp. *ἀναμνησθέντα*, 81 D, and see note on *ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ*, 79 B.

B **εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν**] See note on 86 D.

εἰ ποιόν τι ἐστι] English idiom does not admit of our bringing in a question in this hypothetical way. We have to say, 'What kind of thing in the soul must virtue be, to admit of being taught, or not to admit of it?' Cp. Rep. I. 333 C; Xen. Mem. I. 4. § 14; *ἀλλ' ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν*; here we should say, 'What must they do before you will think that they have a care for you?'

C **τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος**] See note on *τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς*, 79 E.

D **ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, κ.τ.λ.**] 'That virtue in itself is good,' i. e. absolutely good. Cp. Phaedo 65 D, *φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν*; Theaet. 146 E, *γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν*; Phil. 60 A, *καὶ δὴ καὶ τἀγαθὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ξύμπασι*; Prot. 60 E, *τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή*; Rep. 363 A, *οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες*, 493 E, *αὐτό τι ἕκαστον*. Sometimes the neuter article is used after *αὐτό*, as *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*, Phaedo 74 A; *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, Rep. 493 E. It is rare to find the pronoun otherwise than in the neuter gender, as *αὐτὴ κίνησις*, Soph. 256 B; *αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης*, Parm. 130 B. The pronoun and noun are never compounded by Plato, as in Aristotle's *αὐτοέκαστον*, *αὐτοάνθρωπος*, etc.

E **πλοῦτος δή**] 'Wealth, of course'—said with allusion to the avarice of the Sophists and the character of Meno. The enumeration of bodily and external goods here given—health, strength, beauty, and wealth—is derived from a popular drinking-song, to which we have a reference in the Gorgias (451 E), *οἶομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολίον, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ἄδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἀριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν*

γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως. Beauty, according to Greek ideas, was even more essential to happiness than strength. Cp. Euthyd. 279 A; Laws I. 631 C; 661 A.

σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] See note on *τηλευτὴν καλεῖς τι*; 75 D. **88 A**

ἄττα. See note on *ἄττα*, 78 C. **B**

φρόνησις] Notice the tacit assumption of the identity of *φρόνησις* with *ἐπιστήμη*. In Xen. Mem. IV. 6. § 7, and in Plat. Theaet. 145 E Socrates makes a similar identification of *σοφία* and *ἐπιστήμη*. It was left for Aristotle to discriminate the meaning of the three terms.

ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. what Nicias says in the Laches 197 A, *Οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλ' ἄφοβον καὶ μωρόν.* In this dialogue courage is tentatively defined as 'the knowledge of what is calculated to inspire fear or confidence, both in war and in all other matters' (195 A). On the subject of brute courage see Arist. Eth. Nic. III. (8), §§ 10–12; and cp. Plato, Rep. IV. 430 B.

καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα] 'Both learning and training.' We have here the rhetorical figure 'chiasmus,' *καταρτυόμενα* referring to the former word, *σωφροσύνη*, and *μανθανόμενα* to the latter, *εὐμάθεια*.

αὐτῷ] This refers to *ἀρετή*, but the intervention of *τῶν ἐν τῇ* **C** *ψυχῇ τι* is sufficient to account for the neuter. The dative *ὠφελίμῳ* is the regular construction with a copulative verb. For Riddell's view see Digest § 183.

καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα] This is an accusative, which is taken **D** up again by the pronoun *αὐτά* at the end, owing to the long suspension of the construction.

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κ.τ.λ.] For the supremacy of the soul in man cp. **E** Rep. III. 403 D, *ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται, ὃ ἂν χρηστὸν ᾖ σῶμα, τοῦτο τῇ αὑτοῦ ἀρετῇ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὑτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστον.*

ἵνα μηδείς, κ.τ.λ.] There is an ambiguity underlying the use of **89 B** *ἵνα* here, since with the indicative it signifies a purpose not realised, while with the optative, in the next clause, the question of realisation is not raised. See Riddell, Digest § 57.

ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν] 'But can we have been **C** wrong in admitting this?'—'Num hoc minus recte concessimus?' The question is conveyed by *μή*, while *οὐ* coalesces with *καλῶς*. Cp. Lysis 213 D; Prot. 312 A ad fin.

ἐδόκει μέν] For the absence of any clause with δέ cp. note on *Ἕλλην μέν*, 82 B.

ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα] Cp. Phaedo 67 C ad fin. *καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα*: and again 116 A ad fin. *τὸν ἔπειτα βίον*. When used strictly it means the time immediately following, and is not synonymous with *τὸ μέλλον*. Soph. Ant. 611:

τό τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον
καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρκέσει
νόμος ὅδ', κ.τ.λ.

D **ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ, κ.τ.λ.**] After a verb involving a negative notion, such as that of 'distrust,' it is the usual construction in Greek to have the two negatives *μὴ οὐκ*. So below, *οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι*.

ἀνατίθεμαι] The mode of speaking which would be employed in some such amusement as draughts is transferred to the game of dialectic. Cp. Rep. 487 C, *ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις*.

E **εἶεν**] The optative imparts a hypothetical air to the question, *οὖ* being equivalent to *εἴ τινος*. Cp. Charm. 171 E ad fin.; Lysis 214 D ad in. Stallbaum. We may represent the force of the optative by using the past tenses in English—'that if there *were* neither teachers nor learners of a subject, we should be right in conjecturing that it *did* not admit of being taught.' So below 96 C.

πάντα ποιῶν] 'In spite of all my efforts.' Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. X. (7), § 8, *καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ*.

90 A **Ἄνυτος**] Anytus is here represented as the type of conventional propriety. He is referred to in the Apology as the most important of the three accusers of Socrates, who are called collectively *οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον* (Apol. 18 B; cp. Hor. Sat. II. iv. 3 'Anytique reum'). Personally he took up the quarrel of the manufacturing classes and political men against Socrates (Apol. 23 E). His father, Anthemion, had made his fortune as a tanner. Anytus was a prominent leader of the popular party at Athens, and was exiled by the Thirty Tyrants at the same time as Thrasybulus (B.C. 404. Xen. Hell. II. 3. § 42). His character has suffered more at the hands of later writers than of Plato. The Scholiast on the Apology calls him *Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐραστής*: and states further that out of annoyance at some jest of Socrates he bribed Meletus to prefer a charge of impiety against the philosopher. Diogenes Laertius (II. § 43) states that when the Athenians repented too late of their treatment of Socrates, Anytus was sent into banishment, while Meletus was condemned to death.

Πολυκράτους] Polycrates was a tyrant of Samos, who flourished in the reign of Cambyses, and possessed the most powerful navy then in the world (Thuc. I. 13 ad fin.). His preternatural good fortune lost him the friendship of Amasis, king of Egypt, who surmised that he was destined to come to a bad end. This foreboding was verified through the gratuitous treachery of the Persian satrap, Oroetes, who entrapped and crucified him. He was a patron of the poet Anacreon (Hdt. III. 40–3; 120–5).

Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος] He is mentioned again in the Republic (I. 336 A) as an ambitious and wealthy man. We read in Xenophon's Hellenics (III. 5. § 1) that he was one of the leading men among the Greeks who received a bribe from the Persians to make war on the Lacedaemonians during the campaign of king Agesilaus in Asia (about B. C. 394). As the death of Socrates took place in B. C. 399 this bribe cannot be alluded to as the origin of his wealth, though the words *δόντος τινός* look like it, unless Plato is here guilty of an anachronism, and has made Socrates anticipate an event which was fresh in his own mind as he wrote. In that case we would have here a clue to the date of the composition of the Meno.

ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους] Cp. Lach. 186 B ad fin. *διδάσκαλός* **B**
μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου πέρι.

ἆρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν] 'Does not the preceding **C**
question amount to the following?' The three demonstrative pronouns, *ὅδε*, *οὗτος*, and *ἐκεῖνος*, correspond to the three personal ones, *με*, *σε*, *ἑ*, and derive their force from them. Now what a speaker has said is already in possession of his hearer; whereas what he is going to say, no one can know but himself. Hence *ὅδε* with its derivatives is used in introducing a speech or idea, while *οὗτος* with its derivatives is used in referring to what has already been stated. *τοῦτο* here means 'what you have now heard;' *τόδε*, 'what I am going to tell you.' Cp. note on *οὗτος . . . ὅδε*, 81 D, and on *τόδε τὸ χωρίον*, 87 A; also Apol. 37 A, *τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον* (as you imagine), *ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε* (what I am going to tell you) *μᾶλλον*.

ἰέναι] = *φοιτᾶν*. Lat. 'ventitare.' **D**

τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα] 'Does not the same thing hold?' But probably **E**
the words ought to be taken adverbially, and the note of interrogation after *ταῦτα* abolished. The sentence will then run thus, 'With regard to flute-playing then and the rest, is it not in the same way great folly,' etc. In this case the pronoun, while referring to the sentence just expressed, is in apposition to the sentence succeeding, Riddell, Digest § 18.

ζητοῦντα] In agreement with *αὐτόν*, which has to be supplied as

the subject of *παρέχειν*, as is evident from the *μανθάνειν* following. Otherwise there is no reason for the change from the plural *βουλομένους*.

τούτων, οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται, κ.τ.λ.] 'Persons who do not claim.' *οὔτε* would refer to some definite individuals.

μήτ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν] For the transition from the relative to the demonstrative cp. Gorg. 452 D; Rep. III. 395 D, *ὧν φαμεν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι.*

ἔξεστί σε] This is more complimentary than *ἔξεστί σοι* would have been. The latter would have meant 'you have the opportunity;' this means 'there is the opportunity,' i.e. 'I have the opportunity of your assistance.'

91 A ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, κ.τ.λ.] See the note on *ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς* in the title of the dialogue.

ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι] This is specified by Aristotle as coming under the sphere of the virtue of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, Eth. Nic. IV. (2), § 15 *καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς.*

B ὑπισχνουμένους] Cp. Laches 186 C.

οὗτοί εἰσιν] In full *οὗτοί εἰσι τοιοῦτοι.*

C λωβηθῆναι] 'To get himself ruined.' Riddell, Digest § 88, classifies this as an instance of the 'semi-middle' sense of the verb. Cp. Apol. 35 C, where *ἐθίζεσθαι* means 'to let yourselves be accustomed.' There is a good instance of this use in Aristotle (Eth. Nic. III. (1), § 9) *ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή*, 'according as men let themselves be compelled or not.'

οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη] Notice that the copula is attracted into agreement with the predicate, Riddell, Digest § 202. Cp. note on *τοῦτο δὲ φῆς μόριον*, 79 B.

D Πρωταγόραν] Protagoras of Abdera, an elder contemporary of Socrates. He was the first to call himself a Sophist, and to demand a fee for teaching (Prot. 349 A). This fee is said to have been fixed at 100 minae: but if any pupil demurred to paying it, he allowed him to go to the temple, and deposit under oath whatever sum he thought equivalent to the benefit he had received (Prot. 328 B, C; Arist. Eth. Nic. IX. (1), § 5; Diog. Laert. IX. 52). According to the statement of Heracleides Ponticus, a disciple of Aristotle, Protagoras gave laws to the Thurians. As the colony of Thurii was founded by Pericles in B. C. 443, this statement exactly tallies with that of Apollodorus, who says that he flourished (*ἀκμάζειν*) in the 84th Olympiad, and accounts for the selection by the latter of that particular date (Diog. Laert. IX. Cp. § 50 with § 56). For the well-known story of how when a lad he was sent out to gain his living

as a porter, and attracted the attention and patronage of Democritus by his ingenuity in tying wood, see Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. V. 3, and cp. Diog. Laert. IX. § 53. Chronological difficulties have been started with regard to it, on the ground that Democritus was younger than Protagoras (see Smith's Dict. of Gk. and Rom. biography). According to Philostratus, the father of Protagoras was extremely rich, and entertained Xerxes on his way to Greece. This, however, would be quite consistent with subsequent poverty.

τῷ λιμῷ] 'The hunger that would overtake them.' **E**

ἐγγὺς καί, κ.τ.λ.] 'Just about seventy years of age;' Lat. 'Fere septuaginta annos natum.'

εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται] It is extremely difficult to reconcile this statement with the often-repeated story that Protagoras was banished from Athens for blasphemy, and his books publicly burnt. After all, our earliest authority for this anecdote is Cicero (De Nat. Deor. I. ch. 23). The next best is Josephus (against Apion II. 37). It is told also by Philostratus (p. 494, Teubner's ed. vol. II. p. 13), by Diogenes Laertius (IX. § 52), and by Eusebius (Praep. Ev. XIV. 19. § 6. ed. Heinichen). By the time the story reaches Philostratus, Protagoras is hunted over land and sea, and drowned in a small boat in attempting to escape the Athenian trieremes. How is it that in all that has been written by Plato and Xenophon with regard to the trial of Socrates for impiety, there should not be a single reference to the similar charge brought against Protagoras, who was, intellectually, the most prominent man of his day?

ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι] e. g. Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Polus **92 A**
of Acragas. See Prot. 314 C; Rep. X. 600 C; Theag. 127 E ad fin.

πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι] The usual construction with *πολλοῦ δεῖν* is the simple infinitive, as here and above 79 B, *πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν* (cp. Apol. 30 D, 35 D, 37 B; Dem. de Cor. p. 263 ad fin., de Fals. Leg. p. 356): but it may be followed by the accusative article (Theaet. 166 D).

οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες. This might be taken to mean 'who intrust' the young men to them (i.e. to the Sophists): but it seems more natural to take it in the sense of 'who allow them to.'

ἄλλον] We have here the idiomatic use of *ἄλλος*, which allows **B**
of such expressions in Greek as 'there was no tree nor any other grass in the place.' In this passage we may render it 'either;' sometimes 'besides' suits better. Cp. Apol. 36 B, *τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν*, Rep. III. 401 A; and see Riddell, Digest § 46.

οὗ . . . εἵης] 'If you were entirely without experience of it.' See **C**
note on *εἶεν*, 89 E.

ἀλλὰ γάρ] The *γάρ* points to an ellipse. 'But let this pass, for,' etc.

D **ἐκείνους εἰπέ, κ.τ.λ.**] *ἐκεῖνος* here, like the Latin 'ille,' looks on to what is coming. The natural construction would be a relative clause after it—*ἐκείνους εἰπὲ παρ' οὓς ἀφικόμενος*, but owing to the parenthetical clause which intervenes, we have this replaced by a dependent question—*παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος*. Stallbaum.

φράσας] The aorist may be used of a contemporaneous act, if it be not regarded as continuous—'benefit in the telling.' Stallbaum remarks that it would certainly have been *φράσον* in the imperative.

E **παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ**] The conjunctive here is deliberative. Cp. Phaedo 115 C ad fin. *καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δή, πῶς με θάπτῃ ;*

Τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου, κ.τ.λ.] So in the imaginary cross-examination in the Apology Meletus is made to say that the jurors, the audience, the members of the council, the members of the assembly, in fact the whole body of Athenian citizens, were fitter to be intrusted with the education of the young than Socrates.

τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν] Practically the upper class of Athenian citizens. Cp. Rep. VIII. 569 A.

93 B **τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν**] 'And in investigating what you have heard me say, I will tell you what we are investigating.' See note on 90 C.

ἦν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν] Notice that adjectives can be followed by a cognate accusative as well as verbs. Cp. Apol. 20 A ad fin. *ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτὸ καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν* : ibid. D, *τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός*. See Riddell, Digest § 3.

ἢ οὔ παραδοτόν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Or whether this is not a thing that a man can transmit, or one receive from another.' The force of the verbal adjective is active.

C **κἀκεῖνον εἶναι**] Supply *ἂν φαίης* from above.

φθονεῖν] Imperfect infinitive.

D **ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο**] For the construction cp. Rep. IV. 421 E ad in. *τοὺς υἱεῖς . . . χείρους δημιουργοὺς διδάξεται*. Riddell says that the ascription to the middle voice of the meaning 'to get a thing done by another' is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (*διδάσκεσθαι*) by some passages in the Meno. He declares that the whole point of the present passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself, fortifying his assertion by a comparison with 94 C, where the active *ἐπαίδευσε* is used of a father getting his son taught by others (Digest § 87). But, if this be so, why did Plato add *ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν*

εἴχετο? Besides, is it likely that Themistocles would have had time, even if he had the ability and inclination, to teach his son circus-riding? As for the argument that the active voice in 94 C really conveys (on the principle of 'qui facit per alium facit per se') the meaning that is supposed to be peculiar to the middle, this is a reason for allowing the use to the active voice rather than denying it to the middle. Cp. the parallel passage in the Protagoras (319 E). On the whole then we may safely say that 'the third sense of the middle voice' need not be expunged from the grammars.

σοι] Ethic dative. **E**

ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον] Cp. Theaet. 186 A, *ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα*, where Campbell remarks that in such expressions the article retains its demonstrative force, comparing Euthyd. 303 C ad fin. and Oed. Col. 742 (Dindorf).

Λυσίμαχον] This son of Aristeides the Just appears along with **94 A** Melesias, the son of Thucydides, among the interlocutors in the Laches. They are there represented as old men, lamenting the neglect of their own education, and resolved not to let *their* sons suffer in the same way. Lysimachus had been intimate with Sophroniscus, the father of Socrates, and belonged to the same deme as the philosopher—that of Alopecae (Laches 179 C, D; 180 C, D). We learn from Demosthenes (against Leptines, p. 491) that the Athenians, in gratitude for his father's services, assigned him an allotment of land in Euboea, together with a sum of money, on the motion of Alcibiades. Aristeides, the son of this Lysimachus, was committed to the charge of Socrates: but the latter confessed subsequently that his attempts to educate him had proved a complete failure (Laches 200 C; Theaet. 151 A ad in.). He does not appear to have succeeded much better with Thucydides, the son of Melesias (Theag. 130 A, B).

υἱεῖς] These sons of Pericles figure in the Protagoras (315 A, **B** 319 E, 328 C); they are referred to in the First Alcibiades (118 D, E) as being foolish. The Scholiast on the passage adds the information that they were nick-named, each of them, *βλιττομάμμας*, which practically amounts to 'booby' (cp. Aristoph. Clouds 1001). Valerius Maximus, therefore, is rhetorical in speaking of them as youths of great promise ('duobus mirificis adolescentibus') when describing the strength of mind with which Pericles bore their loss. They fell victims to the plague within four days of one another, B. C. 429 (Val. Max. V. ch. 10, ext. § 1).

ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ᾗ διδακτόν] The phrase is repeated in E below. Cp. Apol. 39 A, *ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ᾖ χαλεπόν*. The easiest explanation of such expressions is to suppose an ellipse of some word like

δέδοικα or *ὅρα*. Riddell classifies them as instances of the presumptive variety of the deliberative conjunctive; Digest § 59.

τοὺς φαυλοτάτους] There is a touch of the Socratic *εἰρωνεία* about this. The instances already selected had really been the strongest possible.

ἀδυνάτους] For the acc. following cp. Polit. 295 B, *ἐπεὶ τοῦτ' ἂν δυνατὸς ὤν*: Hipp. Min. 367 E. See note on *δύνασθαι*, 77 B.

C **Θουκυδίδης**] The son of Melesias. A conservative statesman at Athens, and unsuccessful rival of Pericles.

Μελησίαν] See note on *Ανσίμαχον*, 94 A.

ἀκοῇ] 'To remember by hearsay' is certainly a loose expression: but *μέμνησαι* preceding is practically equivalent to *οἶσθα*, and accepted by the speaker as such.

Οὐκοῦν δῆλον, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence is perfectly perspicuous, though highly involved. It contains two dependent clauses, the former of which has a *μέν* both in the protasis and the apodosis, which is answered by a corresponding *δέ* in the protasis and apodosis of the latter. For a similar arrangement of particles cp. the long sentence in the Apology, 28 D, E, beginning *Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινά*. In the sentence at present before us the influence of the negative in *οὐκ ἄν ποτε* extends over both the dependent clauses. The real gist of the dependent clauses lies in the participles *δαπανώμενον* and *ἀναλώσαντα* respectively, and not in the verbs. Cp. Apol. 31 B, where see Riddell's note and Digest § 303. The second of the two dependent clauses may be rendered thus—'and yet have omitted to teach them those things in the case of which he had no need to spend anything, in order to make them good men.'

D **εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν**] The singular is sufficiently accounted for by supposing that the writer has in his mind the question *ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή*;

καὶ οἰκίας, κ.τ.λ.] We have here an answer to the rhetorical question just put—'Why, he was not only a member of a great house, but,' etc.

τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις] *τις* is put for *τινα* by attraction to the relative clause intervening. Cp. Apol. 41 A, *εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς*. See the instances collected by Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 192.

E **Ἀλλὰ γάρ, κ.τ.λ.** 'But the fact is, my friend Anytus, I am afraid that virtue is not a thing that can be taught.' For *ἀλλὰ γάρ* in this sense cp. Apol. 19 C, D and 25 C ad in., and see Riddell, Digest § 147. It is usual to explain *ἀλλὰ γάρ* by supposing an ellipse (cp. note on 92 C). Here, for instance, the full expression might be—'But why say more? For,' etc.

ῥᾴδιον] Here equivalent to *ῥᾷον* by ellipse of *μᾶλλον*. Cp. Soph. Aj. 966

ἐμοὶ πικρὸς τέθνηκεν ἢ κείνοις γλυκύς,

and see Riddell, Digest § 170.

Ἄνυτος μέν] This is answered, though late, by *σὺ δέ* below. **95 A**
Two pairs of counter-balanced clauses, one pair with *πρῶτον μέν* and *ἔπειτα*, the other with the ordinary *μέν* and *δέ*, intervene before we get the antithesis which was latent in the mind of the speaker when he began.

διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι ἤ, κ.τ.λ.] For *τε* followed by *ἤ* instead of the usual *καί* cp. Theaet. 143 C; Ion 535 D. Stallbaum.

οἷς μηδέ, κ.τ.λ.] 'If they are not even agreed about this.'

Γοργίου] This is a kind of partitive genitive—'What I most **C**
admire in Gorgias.' Cp. Laws 631 A, *καὶ σοῦ τὴν μὲν ἐπιχείρησιν τῆς ἐξηγήσεως περὶ τοὺς νόμους παντάπασιν ἄγαμαι.*

πέπονθα] *πάσχω* is often used thus to express a state of mind, Cp. Apol. 17 A ad in.; ibid. 22 A.

οἶσθ' ὅτι] 'Are you aware, I say?' An infinitive clause, *τὸν* **D**
ποιητὴν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν, would have sufficed, except for emphasis. The *οἶσθ' ὅτι* is repeated for the third time below.

ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν] The use of *ποῖος* for the simple *τίς* seems generally to indicate surprise, indignation, or a tendency to objection. Compare Gorg. 490 D, *ποίων ἱματίων*; 'Clothes indeed! Nonsense' (Cope). So also Char. 174 B; Euthyd. 304 E; Hipp. Maj. 285 D.

ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις] See Theog. lines 33-6. The second distich is quoted also by Socrates in Xenophon's Memorabilia (I. 2. § 20).

συμμίσγῃς] The Epic and Ionic form *συμμίσγω*, for *συμμίγνυμι*, **E**
is used sometimes by Plato himself. See Phileb. 23 D ad in.; Laws III. 678 C.

Ἐν ἄλλοις δέ] Theog. 435–8.

λέγει πως] 'He somehow says.'

Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] On the divorce of practice from tneory **96 A**
in the case of political virtue see Arist. Eth. Nic. X. (9), § 18, who evidently has the conclusion of the Meno before his mind. See also Laches 186 C.

ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ, κ.τ.λ.] A strong instance of inverse attraction, where the antecedent is drawn into the case of a relative not yet expressed. So below C, *πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι, κ.τ.λ.* It is like Vergil's 'Urbem, quam statuo, vestra est.' It differs from the case in 94 D, in that the relative clause has there already come in to modify the subsequent construction. Here

we have the effect produced during the process of mental conception. See Riddell, Digest § 191. To the instances there given add two from Stallbaum, Lysis 221 B ad fin.; Rep. VII. 520 D. In another part of the Digest (§ 26 D) Riddell explains this genitive on a different principle and refers us to § 191 for reasons why it is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative. Perhaps he intended to alter the later passage.

οὐχ ὅπως] 'Not only not,' which is sometimes the meaning of 'non solum,' or 'non modo,' in Latin. Riddell remarks that the negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the *οὐχ ὅπως* clause; Digest § 152.

C **Εἰ δέ γε μή, κ.τ.λ.**] Supply *οὐκοῦν* from the last question.

πράγματος οὗ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. 89 E and note.

D **ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη**] Render *ἤ*, 'or if there are.' It does not introduce the second member of the dependent question, which is suppressed.

καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος] See note on 75 E.

προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν] The parallel construction of the neuter gerundive was an archaism in classical Latin.

'Aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum est.'
Lucr. I. 112.

Yet Cicero has it in the De Senectute (ch. 2 ad fin.) 'viam . . . quam nobis quoque ingrediundum sit.'

E **ἢ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγειν, κ.τ.λ.**] The construction here appears hopeless. Two things seem clear, namely, that the *ἤ* refers us back to *ζητητέον* before the parenthesis, and that *τὸ γνῶναι* is subject to *διαφεύγειν*. Stallbaum explains the passage by supplying *ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι* from *ζητητέον*. The best of the instances he adduces as parallel are Crito 51 B; Gorg. 492 D; Rep. VII. 525 B: but none of these present the change of subject which constitutes the difficulty here. This passage could only be assimilated to the rest by taking *ἡμᾶς* as subject to *διαφεύγειν*, and forcing upon the words the meaning 'or else perhaps we must abandon the attempt to ascertain.' With a different punctuation it would be possible to say that *διαφεύγειν* is loosely put for *ὅτι διαφεύγει* and is coordinate with the clause immediately preceding. In that case render, 'Or that else perhaps we cannot know,' etc.

ὅτι μέν] This is answered by *Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν* below in 97 A. In what follows we have an instance of what Riddell calls 'binary structure,' as the clause *ὅτι οὐκ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.* simply repeats in a slightly different form the preceding one *ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθούς, κ.τ.λ.* Riddell, Digest § 229.

ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ] Supply *ὁ ἡγούμενος.* **97 A**

Πῶς δὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις] Stallbaum says that *ὀρθῶς* is here used 'materially,' quoting Soph. Ant. 567

ἀλλ' ἥδε μέντοι μὴ λέγ'· οὐ γάρ ἐστ' ἔτι.

He might have quoted Theaet. 147 A, *ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλύς*, or Phil. 34 E, *Διψῇ γε που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τι*; But surely the sense is against him? Meno does not want Socrates to explain the meaning of the word 'rightly;' he wants to know what else could guide rightly but wisdom. Supply *ἡγεῖσθαι* therefore with *ὀρθῶς*.

οὐδὲν χείρων] 'Quite as good'—by the figure 'meiosis' or **B**
'litotes.'

τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής] 'Whereas right opinion was that **C**
too,' namely, 'a guide to right action,' understood from *ἡγεῖται*. *τὸ δέ* introduces a counter-statement, and may be rendered 'whereas,' 'but in fact,' or quite literally, 'but for that matter.' Instances of this idiom abound everywhere in Plato, e. g. Pol. 263 D; Char. 165 B, 166 C; Lysis 204 D ad fin.; Rep. 527 D; Laws 642 A.

οὐκ ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι] The *ἄν* has to be supplied from above. Its repetition there, perhaps, led to its omission here. There are, however, occasional instances to be found of the optative used conditionally without *ἄν*. See Riddell, Digest § 66.

πολὺ τιμιωτέρα] On the superiority of knowledge to right **D**
opinion cp. Rep. VI. 506 C.

εἴπω] Deliberative conjunctive.

τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν] Cp. Euthyphro 11 B; Aristotle, Politics I. 4.

ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστι παρ' ὑμῖν] The language here is playful, and we are not to infer that such marvellous automata existed at Athens any more than in Thessaly. The way in which Aristotle speaks of them plainly shows that they were mythical—*ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τρίποδας*. (For the latter see Homer Il. XVIII. 376.) The Scholiast on this passage of the Meno supplies a rationalistic explanation of the legend. He says that the early statuaries used to make images with their eyes closed, and their legs in one block. But Daedalus, by representing the eyes of his statues as open, and giving an air of motion by the separation of the legs, made them so life-like that they actually seemed as if they might walk off, if they were not looked after.

ἐκτῆσθαι] Perfect with augment in place of reduplication. Cp. **E**
Rep. VI. 505 B, where *κεκτήμεθα* in one line is followed by *ἐκτῆσθαι* in another.

πρὸς τί οὖν δή, κ.τ.λ.] Notice the 'rhetorical interrogation,'

answered by the speaker himself, the object being to awake attention. Riddell, Digest § 325.

καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι] 'For true opinions also.' *καὶ γάρ* is here equivalent to *καὶ γὰρ καί*. Cp. Apol. 18 E, *καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, κ.τ.λ.*

καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα] ''Tis a mighty fine thing.' Somewhat colloquial. Cp. Alcib. II. 147 C.

98 A **ἔπειτα μόνιμοι**] Cp. Polit. 309 C, *ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως.*

B **ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, κ.τ.λ.**] 'Am speaking from conjecture, not from knowledge.'

οὐ πάνυ] 'Non omnino,' but used by litotes for 'omnino non.'

ἓν δ' οὖν] An instance of the emphatic use of *δέ* in the apodosis. Cp. Apol. 38 A.

C **εἴπερ εἶεν**] Subjunctive use of the optative, where the principal clause is itself optative. Riddell, Digest § 73.

D **οὐδ' ἐπίκτητα**] 'Nor are they so to be acquired,' i. e. in the course of nature. **οὐδέτερον** preceding is plural in sense.

εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν] *ἡ ἀρετή* has to be supplied from *οἱ ἀγαθοί.*

Κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι] This was implied in the words in 87 C, *ἡ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην*;

99 A **ἔτι**] 'In that case.' Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. III. 1. § 22.

B **οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα**] 'Themistocles and the like.' Cp. Apol. 18 B, *τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον*, 'Anytus and his coadjutors.' The person mentioned is himself included. So Crat. 399 E ad fin. This way of speaking is as old as Homer. See Iliad III. 146; VI. 436, 7.

C **οὐδὲν διαφερόντως**] We have here extended to practical statesmen the same half-jocular theory of inspiration which Plato elsewhere applies to poets and rhapsodists. See Apol. 22 B, C; Ion 533 E.

ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά] It may be, as Stallbaum says, that this is not the same thing as *πολλὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ*, but that the *καί* serves to intensify the *πολλά*—'a great many true things.' But cp. Arist. E. N. I. 10. § 12.

θείους τε] Notice the curious anticipatory use of *τε*.

D **αἵ γε γυναῖκες**] Women of all countries are strong in the language of admiration. In the Cratylus (418 C ad in.), Plato alludes to the conservative influence exercised by women upon language. Compare the admiration expressed by Crassus for the diction of his mother-in-law, which reminded him, he declared, of Plautus and Naevius (Cic. de Orat. III. § 45).

θεῖος ἀνήρ] Plato has Atticized the expression. In the Laconian dialect it would be *σεῖος ἀνήρ* (Arist. Eth. Nic. VII. (1), § 3).

100 A **ἔφη Ὅμηρος**] Od. X. 495.

ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ εὐθύς] 'In the same way such a man would be at once (*καὶ εὐθύς*).' For this adverbial use of *ταὐτόν* cp. Phil. 37 D ad fin.

φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.] 'It is plain that virtue comes.' B

εἰσόμεθα τότε] Cp. the end of the Protagoras, 360 E, 361 A, where the same question is shelved in the same way.

ἔστιν ὅ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις] By saving them from the dis- C grace of condemning Socrates.

APPENDIX

On the Problem illustrative of 'Hypothesis.'

The solution of this problem offered in the note on 86 E is there declared to be 'for want of a better.' It never appeared to me satisfactory, for it has the fatal defect of representing Plato as a tiro in mathematics, in which he is known to have been a master. Thanks to the ingenuity of Professor Butcher and the improvements upon the original idea made by Professor J. Cook Wilson, a better explanation has certainly been supplied, of which the student ought to be given the benefit.

Wishing to illustrate the nature of 'hypothesis,' Plato supposes a geometer to be asked whether it is possible to inscribe a given area in the form of a triangle in a given circle. The geometer replies that he does not yet know whether this area admits of being so inscribed, but that *as an hypothesis* he thinks it may be of use to say that, if this area be such that, when applied in the form of a rectangle to the diameter of the given circle, it is in defect by a rectangle similar to the applied rectangle itself, one consequence seems to him to ensue (namely, that a triangle of the same area can be inscribed in the circle) and again another (namely, that such a triangle cannot be found), if it be impossible for it to be treated thus. Hypothetically then he is willing to pronounce judgement as to whether the given area can or cannot be inscribed in the circle.

Before going further it may be well to explain what is meant by a rectangle being in defect. In the strict sense a rectangle or other parallelogram is said by Euclid to be 'applied' to a straight line, when it is described upon it as one of its sides. But the line may be longer than the side of the parallelogram, so that, while the latter coincides with one of its extremities, it fails to reach the other. In that case the parallelogram is said to be 'in defect' of the parallelogram described upon the whole line (in the same

angle and between the same parallels) by the parallelogram which is thus left upon the remaining part.



Thus DC is in defect of DB by EB.

Let it also be understood that the given area is conceived of as a plane rectilineal figure.

There are now two things that require to be proved—

(1) that, if such a rectangle as Plato describes can be found, then a triangle equal to it can be inscribed in the circle;

(2) that, if no such rectangle can be found, a triangle of the given area cannot be inscribed in the circle.

If these two points are established, Plato is justified in the criterion he has selected as to the possibility of inscribing a given area in a given circle.



Let X be the given area and ABC the given circle, of which the diameter is AB.

Let it be supposed that a rectangle ADEF, equal to X, has been applied to AB and is in defect by the rectangle FEGB similar to ADEF, so that AF : FE :: FE : FB.

Join AE and EB.

Then because AF : FE :: FE : FB,

the angle AEB is a right angle.

∴ E is a point on the circumference of the circle.

Produce EF to meet the circumference again in H, and join AH.

Then AEH is an isosceles triangle inscribed in the circle.

And it is equal to the rectangle ADEF, since each of them is double of the triangle AEF.

∴ AEH is equal to X.

∴ If a rectangle equal in area to a given rectilineal figure can be found, such that, when applied to the diameter of a given circle, it is in defect by a rectangle similar to itself, an isosceles triangle, equal to the same rectilineal figure, can be inscribed in the same circle.

Conversely in the same figure it can be shown that, if an isosceles triangle equal to X can be inscribed in the circle, it is possible to apply to the diameter AB a rectangle equal to it such that it is in defect by a rectangle similar to itself.

∴ If no such rectangle can be found, an isosceles triangle of the given area cannot be inscribed in the circle.

But, if an isosceles triangle of the given area cannot be inscribed in the circle, neither can a scalene. For, if a scalene triangle of the given area were inscribed in the circle, then on the same base an isosceles triangle could also be inscribed.

And that isosceles triangle would be greater than the scalene, being on the same base, but of greater altitude.

But if an isosceles triangle of any given area can be inscribed, an isosceles triangle of any lesser area can also be inscribed.

∴ If a scalene triangle of the given area were inscribed in the circle, an isosceles triangle equal to it could also be inscribed.

∴ If an isosceles triangle equal to X cannot be inscribed in the circle, neither can a scalene.

∴ If no such rectangle as Plato describes can be found, no triangle of the given area can be inscribed in the circle.

∴ If a given area be such that, when applied in the form of a parallelogram to the diameter of a given circle, it is in defect by a parallelogram similar to itself, a triangle of the same area can be inscribed in the circle, whereas, if it be impossible for it to be treated thus, such a triangle cannot be found.—Q. E. D.

So much for the matter of the problem. Now a word as to the language.

χωρίον is a plane area which may assume the form of one or another rectilineal figure. When Plato speaks of applying an area to a given line, we may assume him to mean that it is to be applied in the form of a parallelogram: for παραβάλλειν, which corresponds to Plato's παρατείνειν, is habitually

used by Euclid in connexion with parallelograms, and sometimes in the same elliptical manner as *παρατείνειν* is here.

For the sake of simplicity attention has been confined in the proof to the case in which the parallelogram is a rectangle.

τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμήν may mean simply 'its given line,' i.e. the line to which it is to be applied, namely, the diameter of the circle.

The use of *ἐλλείπειν* in Euclid VI. 27, 28, with its opposite *ὑπερβάλλειν* in vi. 29, is probably what gave the clue to the solution of the problem.

We are met by a syntactical difficulty in the words *οἷον . . . παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν*. Professor Cook Wilson would explain this as an anacolouthon parallel to Apol. 21 C *διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ κ.τ.ἑ.* But is he not here putting the grammatical conscience to too severe a strain? The *accusativus pendens* *παρατείναντα* is not really parallel to the *nominativus pendens* in the Apology, to say nothing of the suppression of the dative after it. If we may not amend the text into *παρατείναντι*, it seems the lesser evil to take *παρατείναντα* as the subject of *ἐλλείπειν*, or else to put upon *ἐλλείπειν* the otherwise unsupported meaning of 'to leave short.'

Those who are interested in the whole subject ought to consult the article by Professor Butcher in the *Journal of Philology* (XVII. 34, p. 219) and the subsequent one by Professor J. Cook Wilson in the same periodical (vol. XXVIII. p. 222).

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